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EDITORIAL 
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In spring 2011, considerable challenges still lie 
ahead for the euro area economy, which require 
a comprehensive policy response. Especially in 
the light of the sovereign debt problems in some 
euro-area Member States, the most significant 
challenges are to ensure fiscal sustainability, 
secure lasting growth, tackle macroeconomic 
imbalances, repair and strengthen the financial 
system, and ensure effective support for the most 
vulnerable Member States. 
The European Council of 24/25 March 2011 has 
delivered a comprehensive package of crisis 
responses that address all of the aforementioned 
challenges. Firstly, the Council has agreed to 
create a permanent crisis resolution mechanism 
in the form of the European Stability Mechanism 
(ESM). This will be put into operation in July 
2013 and will provide conditional financial 
assistance to vulnerable euro-area Member 
States, and commands a total effective lending 
capacity of €500bn. The ESM will replace the 
temporary lending facilities of the European 
Financial Stability Mechanism (ESFM) and the 
European Financial Stabilisation Facility 
(EFSF), which will be in operation until June 
2013. The March Council further decided to 
raise the effective lending capacity of the EFSF 
to €440bn, bringing the EFSF's and EFSM's 
combined effective lending capacity to €500bn. 
Secondly, at the March European Council all 
euro-area Member States and six of the ten non-
euro Member States adopted the Euro Plus Pact, 
which reinforces their commitment to foster 
growth and convergence within the area. Its 
principal aims are to strengthen the economic 
pillar of EMU by fostering competitiveness and 
employment, contribute further to the 
sustainability of public finances and reinforce 
financial stability. It also aims at generating a 
new quality of economic policy coordination in 
the euro area, as the Pact goes beyond the 
structural reform measures already envisaged to 
date and focuses on policy areas for which 
responsibility primarily lies with the Member 
States.  
The EPP therefore complements and strengthens 
the implementation of the various strands of 
economic policy coordination underway in the 
recently-initiated EU Semester. In this context, 
the March Council meeting endorsed the 
priorities for fiscal consolidation and structural 
reform set out in the Annual Growth Survey 
which initiates the European Semester. All 
Member States will translate these priorities into 
concrete measures to be included in their 
Stability or Convergence Programmes and 
National Reform Programmes. Finally, the 
March Council also welcomed the position 
reached in the Council on the six legislative 
proposals on economic governance, and called 
for work to be taken forward with a view to their 
adoption by the Council and the European 
Parliament in June 2011. 
The first focus section in this edition of the 
Quarterly Report aims at placing the 
comprehensive policy overhaul adopted by the 
March European Council in the context of the 
EU's entire crisis response to date, and concludes 
that considerable headway has now been made 
in making the euro area more resilient and 
better-placed to seize future growth 
opportunities. Efforts to deliver an adequate 
crisis management response are being 
complemented by an overhaul of economic and 
financial governance in the EU, which will go a 
long way towards setting the euro area back on 
course towards stability, growth and 
employment. 
Turning to the economic situation, the economic 
recovery in the euro area is well underway, but 
we have not yet reached pre-crisis levels of 
output and it is likely that Member States' 
growth potential has suffered lasting damage. 
The Commission's March 2011 interim forecast 
presents our latest assessment of the euro area 
outlook, which is for marginally stronger annual 
GDP growth in the euro area (1.6%) this year 
than expected in autumn. The interim forecast 
acknowledged the considerable uncertainties 
surrounding this central scenario. Since the 
forecast's publication on 1 March, the previously 
balanced risk assessment has now tilted towards 
the downside, in view of renewed commodity 
price volatility and political events, notably the 
political unrest in the Middle East and Northern 
Africa, and through the devastating effects of the 
Japanese earthquake and tsunami.  
Downside risks also exist for medium-term 
recovery prospects. This edition of the Quarterly 
Report features as a special topic an 
investigation into business and consumer survey 
data. Survey data suggest that the recovery 
remains on track but is characterised by 
unusually sluggish and rather unbalanced 
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growth. Furthermore, surveys point to a number 
of potential features of the recovery in the 
medium-term. These include lingering worries 
among consumers, particularly concerning their 
own financial situation, unemployment risks and 
general prospects for the economy. On the 
supply side, industrial surveys point to low 
investment expectations and the possibility that 
the crisis may have brought about losses in 
productive capacity. 
The March interim forecast further noted an 
uptick in headline HICP inflation on the back of 
a surge in energy and commodity prices in the 
last few months. The inflation forecast for 2011 
was thus revised up to 2.2% in the euro area. 
Nevertheless, the remaining economic slack, 
subdued wage growth and overall well-anchored 
inflation expectations should contribute to keep 
underlying inflationary pressures in check. Our 
second focus section in this edition of the 
Quarterly is devoted to exploring recent inflation 
trends in the euro area, and confirms the 
importance of cyclical, but also of structural and 
geopolitical factors in the recent upward drift. It 
finds that the acceleration of inflation is mainly 
driven by non-core items (mainly oil, but also 
cereals and precious metals), and that underlying 
(domestic) price pressures still remain subdued, 
not least due to the large amount of spare 
capacity and well-anchored expectations. 
A further special topic in this edition deals with 
the likely growth impact from further banking 
recapitalisations under a move to the Basel III 
regulations on capital adequacy. The chapter  
concludes that, on balance, higher capital 
requirements may entail slightly lower GDP 
levels (-0.15 pp from baseline) at the end of the 
8-year modelling horizon because of higher 
lending costs; however, these would be 
associated with a significant reduction in GDP 
volatility and would ultimately lead to a more 
resilient financial system as a whole. 
Furthermore, the GDP losses in normal times, 
due to capital regulation must be seen in relation 
to permanent GDP losses from financial crises. 
Estimates taking this into account find 
substantial net social benefits of higher capital 
requirements. 
I would like to end on a wholeheartedly positive 
note by welcoming Estonia, which joined the 
euro area on 1 January 2011, as the newest of 
now 17 participating Member States. Being a 
prime example of a particularly dynamic 
converging economy, it has overcome some 
associated challenges through the timely 
implementation of prudent and far-sighted 
policies, as a further special topic in this edition 
explains. In several respects, Estonia points the 
way for economic policy reform in vulnerable 
euro-area countries. Sound public finances, 
structural reforms and financial resilience bolster 
the adjustment capacity of the economy and 
boost employment. 
 
MARCO BUTI 
DIRECTOR-GENERAL 
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I.1. Introduction 
The economic and financial crisis that struck the 
euro area in 2008 and 2009 has had wide-ranging 
and long-lasting repercussions, which notably 
manifested themselves in 2010 as a number of 
Member States experienced rising yields and CDS 
spreads amidst sizeable rollover needs. The scale 
and scope of the euro-area's challenges remains 
considerable, primarily in terms of ensuring 
public debt sustainability, fostering growth, 
providing financial assistance to Member States in 
need, and strengthening the framework for 
governance.  
While measures to tackle these challenges were 
already been put in place over the course of the 
crisis, additional important policy responses have 
been taken by the European Council at its meeting 
of 24/25 March 2011. These cover both the 
immediate crisis response as well as permanent 
systemic measures, and the Council notably 
agreed two major improvements to economic and 
financial policy coordination in the euro area: A 
permanent crisis resolution mechanism has now 
been agreed, and euro-area Member States are 
now bound more closely together by a so-called 
Euro Plus Pact, which solidifies their commitment 
to foster competitiveness, growth and 
convergence.  
The focus section at hand provides an overview of 
the comprehensive policy package adopted by the 
March European Council and sets it in the context 
of the broad and ambitious policy response to the 
crisis elaborated in the euro area and the EU since 
the beginning of the crisis.  
I.2.  Immediate crisis responses 
accompanied by systemic overhaul  
Policy action designed to mitigate the adverse 
effects of the crisis and reducing future risks has 
spanned virtually all realms of economic and 
financial policy in the euro area. It has also 
involved a combination of the immediate crisis 
management response, aimed at responding to 
pressing needs in specific countries or sectors, and 
more systemic measures aimed at improving the 
euro-area's governance system.  
The crisis management measures are the result of 
a search for a comprehensive approach to the 
immediate adverse effects and threats posed by 
the crisis. The aim of safeguarding the integrity of 
the euro and all economies of the euro area in the 
face of unprecedented market turmoil lies at the 
heart of this strategy, which comprises action on 
three fronts:  
• In the early stages of the crisis, action has been 
taken to stabilize the financial system and its 
institutions through various measures, 
including the granting of public guarantees, 
capital injections and liquidity support to 
financial institutions via central banks.  
• Secondly, subsequent to the expiry of national 
stimulus measures taken in accordance with 
the European Economic Recovery Programme 
(EERP) of December 2008, sizeable budgetary 
This Focus section aims to provide an overview of recent milestones in strengthening economic governance, 
financial stability and economic growth potential in the euro area. The exceptionally challenging 
circumstances in the euro area since the onset of the crisis have necessitated swift yet profound action by 
Member States in cooperation with the Commission, supported by the ECB's policy stance, in order to regain 
financial stability and deal with a very deep recession. The policy measures adopted since the crisis can be 
broadly divided into crisis management measures and permanent systemic responses.  
Additional important policy decisions to address the euro area's ongoing challenges have been taken by the 
European Council at its meeting of 24/25 March 2011. The Council has notably introduced further systemic 
innovations that represent an overhaul of the legislative and operational framework governing EU economic 
policy coordination. Specifically, the Council has established a permanent crisis resolution mechanism and 
strengthened the political commitment within the euro area to spur economic adjustment and support growth 
and convergence. This Focus concludes that EU's comprehensive policy response will go a long way towards 
setting the euro area back on course towards stability, growth and employment. 
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consolidation is necessary to bring public 
finances in the euro area back on a sustainable 
path. The consolidation strategy agreed at the 
EU level is differentiated in that the more 
vulnerable Member States have begun to 
consolidate sooner. The fiscal stance is set to 
turn restrictive in 2011 in all euro-area 
Member States. However, fiscal efforts vary 
substantially in the short to medium term, as 
deadlines for correction and required structural 
efforts under the Excessive Deficit Procedures 
(EDP) have been differentiated across Member 
States, taking into account country-specific 
circumstances. Once an excessive deficit has 
been corrected, Member States are required to 
continue their consolidation to bring their 
budgetary positions in line with the country-
specific medium-term objectives, which 
require either a structural position close to 
balance or a surplus. 
 
Table I.1: Overview of EU economic policy 
measures since the crisis 
Crisis management measures
Financial Rescue
Emergency public interventions
Macroeconomic stabilisation
European Economic Recovery Plan
Differentiated fiscal consolidation
Excessive Deficit Procedure
Support for vulnerable countries
Programmes for Greece and Ireland,
EFSF and EFSM (combined lending capacity €500bn)
Systemic measures
Strengthened surveillance
6 legislative proposals on imbalances, SGP reform,
national  fiscal frameworks, sanctions
European Semester 
Integrated annual surveillance cycle
Ex-ante guidance of national economic policies
Permanent crisis resolution mechanism
European Stability Mechanism
Europe 2020
Comprehensive strategy for growth, employment 
and social cohesion
Euro Plus Pact
Strengthen economic pillar of EMU and improve 
policy coordination and competitiveness
Financial Repair
Restructuring and stress testing
Strengthening Financial Regulation
Regulating hedge funds and rating agencies
Prudential regulation changes; crisis mechanism for banks 
European System of Financial Supervisors
European Systemic Risk Board 
European Supervisory Authorities
Source: Commission services. 
 
• Thirdly, supporting vulnerable countries is 
essential to ensure stability within the euro 
area. Adjustment programmes for Greece and 
Ireland have therefore been developed over the 
course of 2010 between the respective national 
authorities and the European Commission in 
partnership with the IMF and the ECB. The 
programmes notably feature detailed strategies 
for consolidation and rebalancing in troubled 
economies, as well as medium-term loans via 
the European Financial Stability Facility 
(EFSF) and European Financial Stabilisation 
Mechanism (EFSM) to prevent sovereign 
funding needs in these economies being 
obstructed by prohibitive market conditions. 
The Euro Area Summit of 11 March 2011 
decided to grant an effective lending capacity 
of €440bn to the EFSF until its expiry in 
2013(1) and to lower the interest rate 
applicable to the pooled loan from euro-area 
Member States to Greece by 100bps while 
extending its maturity to 7½ years on average.  
Systemic Response 
Looking beyond the more short-term initiatives, a 
more fundamental and permanent overhaul of 
economic policy coordination at the EU level has 
proven necessary in light of the crisis. The 
principal elements of this systemic response 
agreed at the EU level are a strengthened 
economic surveillance framework (six new 
legislative proposals, the so-called 'governance 
package'), an integrated annual surveillance cycle 
("European Semester"), a permanent crisis 
resolution tool (European Stability Mechanism, or 
'ESM'), a Euro Plus Pact, and a European System 
of Financial Supervisors. In conjunction with the 
aforementioned crisis management measures 
these systemic responses constitute the EU's 
comprehensive approach to tackling the crisis.  
The strengthened surveillance framework 
comprises six legislative proposals which were 
adopted by the Commission on 29 September 
2010. (2) They aim at overhauling the EU 
economic policy framework by reinforcing the 
rules of the Stability and Growth Pact, 
strengthening national budgetary frameworks, 
preventing and correcting harmful 
macroeconomic imbalances, and establishing an 
effective enforcement arm for euro-area countries. 
                                                        
(1) For more details on the EFSF please consult 
http://www.efsf.europa.eu/ 
(2) For a detailed overview of the September 2010 governance 
package see the editorial of the Quarterly Report on the Euro 
Area, Vol.9, No. 3 (2010).  
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The new surveillance framework is expected to be 
enacted in mid-2011, once agreement between the 
Commission, Council and Parliament has been 
reached. 
The integrated annual surveillance cycle 
enshrined in the 'European Semester' will draw 
together all the elements of EU economic 
surveillance, including policies to ensure fiscal 
discipline, macroeconomic stability, and to foster 
growth. The processes under the SGP and the 
Europe 2020 European growth strategy will 
thereby be aligned in timing, while remaining 
legally separated. (3) The aim of the European 
Semester is to provide ex ante policy guidance so 
as to strengthen policy synergies and avoid policy 
inconsistencies. The annual cycle begins with the 
Commission's publication of the Annual Growth 
Survey at the start of each year, which then feeds 
into Member States' Stability and Convergence 
Programmes and National Reform Programmes, 
which they submit in April. (4) The Commission 
then issues assessments and proposes country-
specific opinions and recommendations, which 
the Council adopts in June before national budgets 
are finalised, thereby having a much stronger 
impact on national policy-making than in the past. 
Furthermore, in response to the lack of consistent 
and rigorous financial oversight in the EU prior to 
the crisis, the European System of Financial 
Supervisors was established in November 2010 in 
order to monitor macro-financial risks and 
strengthen financial oversight in the EU. (5) The 
central task of the European Systemic Risk Board 
(ESRB) is to monitor and assess macro-financial 
systemic risk to mitigate the exposure of the 
system to systemic failure and enhancing the 
financial system’s resilience to shocks. In this 
way the ESRB should contribute to preventing 
financial crises and limiting their negative impact 
on the internal market and the real economy, 
while the three European Supervisory Authorities 
                                                        
(3) Europe 2020 is the EU's growth strategy for the coming 
decade with the aim of delivering high levels of employment, 
productivity and social cohesion. Concretely, the Union has 
set five ambitious objectives - on employment, innovation, 
education, social inclusion and climate/energy - to be reached 
by 2020. Each Member State will adopt its own national 
targets in each of these areas. Concrete actions at EU and 
national levels will underpin the strategy. 
(4) The January 2011 Annual Growth Survey is available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/europe2020/pdf/en_final.pdf 
(5) The ESFS comprises: the European Systemic Risk Board 
(ESRB); the three European Supervisory Authorities 
(European Banking Authority, European Insurance and 
Occupational Pensions Authority, European Securities and 
Markets Authority); the Joint Committee of the European 
Supervisory Authorities; and  the competent or supervisory 
authorities in the Member States. 
will ensure a more rigorous and timely oversight 
of individual financial market sections. This 
overhaul of the supervisory framework is 
complemented by improvements in the financial 
regulatory environment, including for banks, 
hedge funds and credit rating agencies, by the 
development of crisis resolution mechanisms for 
banks and by improvements in consumer 
protection. The revised Capital Requirement 
Directive further transposes capital requirements 
for banks under Basel III into EU legislation. It 
will entail a significant increase in the level of 
capital which banks and investment firms must 
hold to cover their risk-weighted assets. (6)  
At the current juncture, a new round of stress tests 
is foreseen for mid-2011, which will help to 
address remaining weaknesses in the euro-area 
banking sector. The EU-wide stress test is a 
supervisory tool designed to assess the resilience 
of European banks to hypothetical external 
shocks. The stress test assesses what might 
happen to banks if external circumstances 
deteriorate markedly and helps to identify 
vulnerabilities and relevant remedial action, 
including strengthening capital levels where this 
is needed notably to meet the higher capital 
requirements under the Basel III regulations. 
Results are expected in June 2011.  
As the 'governance package', the European 
Semester and the new supervisory architecture 
have already been presented or are already in 
operation, the remainder of this Focus will present 
the more recent elements of the EU's systemic 
crisis response, namely the creation of the 
permanent crisis resolution mechanism (ESM) 
and the Euro Plus Pact in greater depth. 
I.3. Towards a permanent ESM 
At its meeting on 24/25 March 2011, the 
European Council acted upon the need for a 
permanent crisis resolution mechanism by 
establishing the European Stability Mechanism 
(ESM). Financial assistance will be provided by 
mutual agreement, (7) if and when euro-area 
Member States are experiencing or are threatened 
by severe financing problems, in order to 
safeguard the financial stability of the euro area as 
a whole. The ESM will take over the role of the 
European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF) and 
                                                        
(6) For an assessment of the economic impact of the Basle III 
capital requirement in the euro area see Section III.1. in this 
issue. 
(7) A decision taken by mutual agreement is a decision taken by 
unanimity of the Member States participating to the vote, i.e. 
abstentions do not prevent the decision from being adopted. 
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the European Financial Stabilisation Mechanism 
(EFSM) in providing financial assistance to euro-
area Member States after their expiry in June 
2013. 
The function of the ESM will be to mobilise 
funding and provide financial assistance under 
strict conditionality, whereby the beneficiary 
Member State will be required to put in place an 
appropriate form of private-sector involvement, 
according to the specific circumstances and in a 
manner fully consistent with IMF practices. (8) 
Support from the ESM will be conditional on the 
adoption of an appropriate macro-economic 
adjustment programme by the recipient country 
and will be based on a rigorous analysis of public 
debt sustainability, conducted by the Commission 
together with the IMF and in liaison with the 
ECB. 
Structure and Instruments 
The ESM will have a Board of Governors 
consisting of the Ministers of Finance of the euro-
                                                        
(8) In line with the IMF, debt is considered sustainable when a 
borrower is expected to be able to continue servicing its debts 
without an unrealistically large correction to its income and 
expenditure. This judgement determines the availability and 
the appropriate scale of financing. 
area Member States (as voting members), with the 
European Commissioner for Economic and 
Financial Affairs and the President of the ECB as 
observers. The Board of Governors will be the 
highest decision-making body of the ESM and 
will take the following major decisions by mutual 
agreement: 
• the granting of financial assistance, 
• the terms and conditions of financial 
assistance, 
• the lending capacity of the ESM, 
• changes to the menu of instruments. 
All other decisions by the Board of Governors 
will be taken by qualified majority, unless stated 
otherwise. Voting weights within the Board of 
Governors and the Board of Directors (9) will be 
proportional to the Member States’ respective 
subscriptions to the capital of the ESM. A 
                                                        
(9) The Board of Directors will carry out specific tasks as 
delegated by the Board of Governors. Each euro-area 
Member state will appoint one Director and one alternate 
Director. In addition, the Commission and the ECB will each 
nominate an observer and an alternate to the Board of 
Directors. 
 
 
Table I.2: Main features of the EFSM, EFSF and ESM 
 
EFSM EFSF ESM
European Financial Stabilisation Mechanism      European Financial Stability Facility European Stability Mechanism
Lending capacity
Lending capacity of €60 bn Effective lending capacity raised to €440 bn Effective lending capacity of €500 bn
joint and several guarantee by EU budget guarantees and over-guarantees paid-in capital + callable capital + guarantees
AAA rating AAA rating AAA rating
Instruments
Loans Loans + bond purchases on primary 
market (as an exception)
Loans + bond purchases on primary 
market (as an exception)
Strict policy conditionality under a 
macro-economic adjustment programme
Strict policy conditionality under a 
macro-economic adjustment programme
Strict policy conditionality under a 
macro-economic adjustment programme
EU Commission + IMF + ECB involvement EU Commission + IMF + ECB involvement EU Commission + IMF + ECB involvement
Pricing
Euribor + 292.5 bps Euribor + 247 bps + EFSF costs
Funding costs + 200bps +100bps for amounts 
outstanding after 3 years 
Beneficiaries
EU Member States Euro-area Member States Euro-area Member States
Duration
New lending capacity expires on 30 June 2013 New lending capacity expires 30 June 2013 Permanent from 1 July 2013
Legal basis
Council Decision based on Art. 122 of the TFEU Temporary intergovernmental agreement Treaty among euro-area MS to establish an 
intergovernmental organisation + Regulation 
based on amended Art. 136 of TFEU
Source: Commission services 
 
I. The EU's comprehensive policy response to the crisis 
 
- 11 -
qualified majority is defined as 80 percent of the 
votes.  The Board of Governors will appoint a 
Managing Director responsible for the day-to-day 
management of the ESM. The Managing Director 
will chair the Board of Directors. 
The ESM will aim to obtain and maintain the 
highest credit rating from the major credit rating 
agencies. In order to secure this, the ESM's total 
subscribed capital of €700bn is well in excess of 
the ESM's effective lending capacity of €500bn. 
€80bn of the total subscribed capital will be in the 
form of paid-in capital provided by the euro-area 
Member States, phased in from July 2013 in five 
equal annual instalments. In addition, the ESM 
will also include a combination of committed 
callable capital and guarantees from euro-area 
Member States, to a total amount of € 620 billion. 
During the transitory phase from 2013 to 2017, 
Member States commit to accelerate the provision 
of appropriate instruments, if needed, in order to 
maintain a minimum 15 % ratio between paid-in 
capital and the outstanding amount of ESM 
issuances. The contribution key of each Member 
State in the total subscribed capital of the ESM 
will be based on a slightly adjusted paid-in capital 
key of the ECB.  
As long as the ESM has not been activated and 
provided that the effective lending capacity is not 
less than €500bn, the proceeds from the 
investment of the ESM paid-in capital will be 
returned to the Member States, after deductions 
for operational costs. Following the first 
activation of the ESM, the proceeds from the 
investment of ESM capital and financial 
assistance activity will be retained within the 
ESM. 
The ESM will as a rule provide financial 
assistance through loans. The Board of Governors 
may review the instruments at the ESM's disposal 
and may decide to make changes to the menu of 
instruments. 
Under its loan facility, called ESM stability 
support (ESS), the ESM can grant short-term or 
medium-term stability support to a euro-area 
Member State experiencing severe financing 
problems. Access to an ESS will require a 
macroeconomic adjustment programme with 
adequate policy conditionality commensurate with 
the severity of the underlying imbalances in the 
beneficiary Member State. The length of the 
programme and maturity of the loans will depend 
on the nature of the imbalances and the prospects 
of the beneficiary Member States regaining access 
to financial markets within the time that ESM 
resources are available. Adequate and 
proportionate private-sector involvement will be 
expected in cases where financial assistance under 
the ESM is provided to the beneficiary State. The 
nature and extent of this involvement will be 
determined on a case-by-case basis and will 
depend on the outcome of a debt sustainability 
analysis. If public debt is deemed sustainable, the 
main private investors will be encouraged to 
maintain their exposure, whereas for non-
sustainable public debt trajectories the beneficiary 
Member State will be required to engage in active 
negotiations with its creditors. 
In exceptional circumstances, the ESM may also 
intervene in debt primary markets through its 
Primary Market Support Facility so as to engage 
in the purchasing of bonds of a Member State 
experiencing severe financing problems. Such 
primary market interventions require the mutual 
agreement of the Board of Governors, and will be 
conducted on the basis of a macro-economic 
adjustment programme with strict conditionality. 
The underlying objective is to maximise the cost 
efficiency of the support programme. Conditions 
and modalities under which bond purchasing 
would be conducted will be specified in the terms 
and conditions of financial assistance.   
Pricing  
The Board of Governors will decide on the 
pricing structure for financial assistance to a 
beneficiary Member State. The ESM will be able 
to lend at a fixed or variable rate. The pricing of 
the ESM will be in line with IMF pricing 
principles and, while remaining above the funding 
costs of ESM, will include an adequate mark-up 
for risks. ESM loan rates will have to cover the 
funding costs of the ESM, supplemented by a 
charge of 200 bps applied on the entire loans, plus 
a surcharge of 100 bps for loan amounts 
outstanding after 3 years. For fixed rate loans with 
maturities above 3 years, the margin will be a 
weighted average of the charge of 200 bps for the 
first 3 years and 200 bps plus 100 bps for the 
following years.  
Collective Action Clauses (CACs) will be 
included for all new euro-area government 
securities with maturity above one year from June 
2013 onwards. The objective of such CACs will 
be to facilitate agreement between the sovereign 
and its private-sector creditors in the context of 
private sector involvement.  
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I.4. The Euro Plus Pact 
On 24 and 25 March 2011 the European Council 
agreed to adopt the 'Euro Plus Pact' (EPP). Its 
principal goals are to strengthen the economic 
pillar of EMU, achieve a new quality of economic 
policy coordination in the euro area, and to 
improve competitiveness and facilitate 
convergence. The EPP focuses primarily on areas 
that fall under national competence and that are 
integral to competitiveness and the avoidance of 
harmful imbalances. Six non-euro area Member 
States have decided to join the Pact.  
The EPP has the following four principal 
objectives at its core, and euro-area Member 
States undertake to take all necessary measures to 
pursue the following objectives: 
• Foster competitiveness 
• Foster employment 
• Contribute further to the sustainability of 
public finances 
• Reinforce financial stability 
The EPP is fully embedded in the institutional set-
up of the EU, including the European Semester, 
and adds a political impetus to the objectives of 
the Europe 2020 growth strategy and the steps 
taken to reinforce economic governance in EMU. 
The Pact makes it each participating Member 
State's responsibility to specify the concrete 
measures needed to reach the objectives of the 
Pact that are deemed relevant to the country. 
Progress towards the common objectives will be 
monitored by the Heads of State or Government 
on the basis of a series of indicators covering 
competitiveness, employment, fiscal sustainability 
and financial stability. Countries facing major 
challenges in any of these areas will be identified 
and will have to commit to addressing these 
challenges in a given timeframe. The Commission 
will assess these commitments in the context of its 
enhanced surveillance.  
On substance, the objectives of the Euro Plus Pact 
are fully in line with those proposed by the 
Commission in the first Annual Growth Survey 
(AGS), which was published on 12 January 2011. 
Within the broad objectives of the Pact listed 
above, attention will be paid to the following 
possible measures, listed by objective: 
Foster competitiveness 
Progress will be assessed on the basis of wage and 
productivity developments and competitiveness 
adjustment needs. To assess whether wages are 
evolving in line with productivity, unit labour 
costs (ULC) will be monitored by comparing 
developments in other euro-area countries and in 
the main comparable trading partners, as large and 
sustained increases in ULCs may lead to the 
erosion of competitiveness. Action to raise 
competitiveness is required in all countries, but 
particular attention will be paid to those facing 
major challenges in this respect.  
Reforms that will be given particular attention are 
those designed to ensure that national cost 
developments are in line with productivity 
developments, while respecting national traditions 
of social dialogue and industrial relations. 
Furthermore, measures to increase productivity, 
for instance by supporting R&D and innovation, 
infrastructure as well as an open and competitive 
business environment will be most important. 
Foster employment  
A well-functioning labour market is central to the 
competitiveness of the euro area. Progress on 
reaching this aim will be assessed on the basis of 
long-term unemployment rates, youth 
unemployment rates and labour participation 
rates. Amongst the reform measures that will be 
given particular attention are labour market 
reforms to promote “flexicurity”, (10) increase 
formal labour market participation, increase 
lifelong learning and employment-activating tax 
reforms. 
Enhance the sustainability of public finances 
In order to bring public finances back onto a 
sustainable footing, the highest attention will be 
paid to measures that increase the sustainability of 
pensions, health care and social benefits. These 
will be assessed on the basis of sustainability gap 
indicators. (11) These indicators measure whether 
debt levels are sustainable based on current 
policies, notably pensions schemes, health care 
and benefit systems, and they also take into 
                                                        
(10) 'Flexicurity' combines features of flexibility and security in 
one labour market and welfare model. Its key feature is that 
not the specific job position is protected, but rather the 
capability of the individual to move between jobs.  
(11) The sustainability gap are indicators agreed by the 
Commission and Member States to assess fiscal 
sustainability, see e.g. Public Finances in EMU 2010: 
http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/publications/european_
economy/2010/pdf/ee-2010-4_en.pdf 
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account demographic factors. Reforms necessary 
to ensure the sustainability and adequacy of 
pensions and social benefits could include 
aligning the pension system to the national 
demographic situation, and increasing the 
participation of older workers. 
Furthermore, as part of the Pact, euro-area 
Member States commit to translating EU fiscal 
rules as set out in the Stability and Growth Pact 
into national legislation. The commitment should 
be seen as reinforcing - for the adherents to the 
pact - the legally binding minimum requirement 
for national budgetary frameworks established in 
the corresponding Directive, which forms part of 
the 'governance package'. Member States will 
retain the choice of the specific national legal 
vehicle to be used, but will make sure that it has a 
sufficiently strong binding and durable nature 
(e.g. constitution or framework law). The exact 
formulation of the rule will also be decided by 
each country (e.g. it could take the form of a "debt 
brake", rule related to the primary balance or an 
expenditure rule), but it should ensure fiscal 
discipline at both national and sub-national levels. 
The Commission will have the opportunity, in full 
respect of the prerogatives of national 
parliaments, to be consulted on the precise fiscal 
rule before its adoption so as to ensure it is 
compatible with, and supportive of, the EU rules. 
Furthermore, attention will be paid to tax policy 
coordination. Pragmatic coordination of tax 
policies is a necessary element of stronger 
economic policy coordination in the euro area, 
which is key to supporting fiscal consolidation 
and growth. Besides exchanging best practices, 
Member States could engage in the development 
of a common corporate tax base, which would be 
a revenue-neutral way of working towards a 
consistent tax framework in the euro area. To this 
end, the Commission tabled a proposal for a 
Council Directive on 16 March. (12)  
Reinforce financial stability 
A strong financial sector is key for the overall 
stability of the euro area. A comprehensive reform 
of the EU framework for financial sector 
supervision and regulation was launched after the 
breakout of the financial crisis. Strict bank stress 
tests, coordinated at EU level, will be undertaken 
on a regular basis, with the aim of guiding 
subsequent bank recapitalisations. In addition, the 
President of the ESRB and the President of the 
Eurogroup will be invited to regularly inform 
                                                        
(12) COM/2011/121 
Heads of State or Government on issues related to 
macro-financial stability and macroeconomic 
developments in the euro area requiring specific 
action. In particular, for each Member State, the 
level of private debt of banks, households and 
non-financial firms will be closely monitored. 
Guiding Rules 
Overall, the Pact represents a renewed effort for 
stronger economic policy coordination for 
competitiveness and convergence and will be 
subject to the following guiding rules: 
Firstly, the Pact is designed to be in line with and 
strengthen the existing economic governance 
arrangements in the EU. It will be consistent with, 
and build on, existing instruments (Europe 2020, 
European Semester, Integrated Guidelines, 
Stability and Growth Pact) and new legislation 
under the governance package, but will involve a 
special effort going beyond what already exists. It 
is foreseen to include concrete commitments and 
actions that are more ambitious than those already 
agreed, and all measures should be accompanied 
with a timetable for implementation. This process 
will be fully in line with the Treaty, and the Pact 
will respect the integrity of the Single Market.  
Secondly, the Pact will be action-oriented and 
cover priority policy areas that are essential for 
fostering competitiveness and convergence. Euro-
area Member States are fully committed to the 
completion of the Single Market which is key to 
enhancing the competitiveness in the EU and the 
euro area. The Pact will concentrate on actions 
where the competence lies with the Member 
States. In the chosen policy areas common 
objectives will be agreed upon at the Heads of 
State or Government level. Participating Member 
States will pursue these objectives with their own 
policy-mix, taking into account their specific 
challenges. 
Thirdly, each year concrete national commitments 
will be undertaken by each Head of State or 
Government. In doing so, Member States will take 
into account best practices and benchmark against 
the best performers, within Europe and vis-à-vis 
other strategic partners. The Commission will 
monitor the implementation of the various 
national commitments and will prepare an annual 
report that will be examined by the Heads of State 
or Government of the euro area and participating 
countries. In addition, Member States commit to 
consult their partners on each major economic 
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reform having potential spill-over effects before 
its adoption.  
Finally, in order to demonstrate a real 
commitment to change and ensure the necessary 
political impetus to reach the Pact's common 
objectives, each year Member States of the euro 
area will agree at the highest level on a set of 
concrete actions to be achieved within 12 months. 
These commitments will also be reflected in the 
National Reform Programmes and Stability 
Programmes submitted each year, which will be 
assessed by the Commission, the Council, and the 
Eurogroup in the context of the European 
Semester.  
Those Member States in a position to do so have 
already announced at the European Council of 
24/25 March the concrete commitments to be 
achieved in the next 12 months. Concrete 
commitments should be included in the National 
Reform and Stability Programmes to be submitted 
in April and will be presented to the June 
European Council.  
I.5. Conclusion 
The exceptionally challenging circumstances in 
the euro area since the onset of the global crisis 
have necessitated swift yet profound action by the 
Commission and Member States in cooperation 
with, notably, the ECB and the IMF in order to 
regain financial stability and deal with a very deep 
recession. Both crisis management measures and a 
systemic overhaul of economic and financial 
policy coordination have been enacted in order to 
support growth, fiscal sustainability, financial 
stability and convergence. First and foremost, this 
comprehensive response has ensured that output 
and employment did not contract excessively in 
Member States, while taking into account the 
limits to demand stimuli that are posed by 
individual countries' budgetary positions. The 
coordination of Member States' budgetary 
consolidation strategies will support the regaining 
of sustainable fiscal positions following the 
unprecedented shock of the crisis. 
 
 
 
 
Vulnerable Member States have received 
conditional financial support through the EFSF, 
EFSM and IMF lending and through bilateral 
loans, as their access to sovereign bond markets 
has been severely impeded during the crisis. The 
temporary lending facilities of the EFSF and 
EFSM will be succeeded in 2013 by a permanent 
crisis resolution mechanism, the European 
Stability Mechanism. All country-specific 
assistance is and will be accompanied by 
comprehensive macroeconomic adjustment 
programmes for the countries in question, which 
support the rebalancing of the economy and 
strengthen its growth potential. Structural 
measures to boost growth and employment for all 
Member States are also pursued under the Europe 
2020 initiative and the Euro Plus Pact, all within 
the streamlined channels of the European 
Semester. 
On the financial front, the EU policy response has 
brought major improvements to the functioning 
and stability of the financial system. Public capital 
injections combined with greatly enhanced 
liquidity provision by the ECB have averted a 
full-blown credit crunch in the short-term. 
Financial stability is now safeguarded in a more 
rigorous way through the European System of 
Financial Supervisors and through manifold 
improvements in the financial regulatory 
environment. Regular stress tests for banks will 
asses the resilience of systemically important 
financial institutions and will guide further capital 
injections, notably to meet the higher capital 
requirements under the Basel III regulations. 
Overall, this combination of policy measures in 
the context of a systemic overhaul of the EU's 
economic policy framework will go a long way 
towards setting the euro area back on course 
towards stability, growth and employment. 
Focus 
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II.1. Recent price developments in the 
euro area 
Inflationary pressures in the euro area have been 
building up in recent months, with the headline 
rate reaching an estimated 2.6 % in March, the 
highest level since October 2008 and about twice 
as high as a year ago. The breakdown for 
February shows that the increase is largely the 
result of higher energy inflation, lifted by rising 
oil prices (Graph II.1). In recent months, the 
structural increase in oil prices witnessed over the 
past two years has been further exacerbated by 
unrest in the Middle East and in North African 
countries. At the same time, prices of other 
commodities — from agricultural raw materials to 
metals — have also been subject to significant 
upward pressures recently. 
Looking closer at the energy component of the 
HICP, euro-area energy inflation increased to 
17.1 % in July 2008, the peak of the previous oil 
shock, after which it fell steadily to -14.4 % 
twelve months later. It returned to positive 
territory in December 2009 and stood at 4.0 % in 
January 2010. In February 2011, annual energy 
inflation was at 13.1 %, up from 12.0 % in 
January. 
Developments in energy inflation largely mirror 
fluctuations in oil prices (Graph II.2). In the year 
to February 2011 the price of a barrel of Brent 
went up by almost 40 % in both dollar and euro 
terms, progressing almost uninterruptedly 
throughout the year to reach a monthly average of 
USD 103.7 (EUR 76.0), about two and a half 
times the December 2008 level. The strongest 
monthly increase occurred from November to 
December 2010, when oil prices increased by 8 % 
in dollar and 11 % in euro terms respectively. In 
the first half of March, the oil price further 
climbed by 11 % from its February level to an 
average of USD 114.9 (EUR 82.7). 
Graph II.1: Composition of euro-area HICP 
inflation (contributions to y-o-y changes — Jan 
2006 to Feb 2011) 
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Source: Eurostat. 
The oil price rebound that started at the end of 
2008 reflects, to a large extent, market 
fundamentals and larger oil demand coming in 
particular from emerging market economies. 
Since the start of 2011, the political turmoil in the 
Inflation in the euro area has picked up in recent months, with the headline rate reaching its highest level since 
October 2008 at an estimated 2.6% in March 2011. This is largely the result of higher commodity prices, 
driven by a combination of cyclical, structural and geopolitical factors. As the acceleration of inflation mainly 
concerns non-core items, underlying price pressures currently remain subdued. Nevertheless, the fall of core 
inflation during the crisis and in its aftermath seems small given the large and only gradually closing negative 
output gap. Analysis within a Phillips curve framework confirms that the output gap is a significant driver of 
core inflation in the euro area, even if its impact is not very large. Core inflation is furthermore found to be 
persistent and driven by expectations and lagged oil prices. Euro-area inflation dispersion has widened with 
the outbreak of the economic and financial crisis and the large commodity price swings that accompanied it. 
This section shows that the strength of the transmission from commodity prices to inflation depends on a 
number of factors, which vary across Member States. Price and inflation differences represent a natural 
feature in a monetary union only to the extent that they foster convergence or underpin the adjustment to 
idiosyncratic shocks. However, often in the past, persistent differences have reflected divergent competitiveness 
developments resulting in harmful imbalances. At the current juncture, there are some indications that national 
inflation patterns in the euro area have started to contribute to the adjustment to macroeconomic imbalances, 
but this process is only beginning. Finally, the section discusses the outlook for inflation based on the recent 
Commission interim forecast.  
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Middle East and North Africa and concerns about 
supply disruptions have put further upward 
pressure on oil prices. The barrel of Brent passed 
the USD 100 mark on 1 February — for the first 
time since the end of September 2008 — 
coinciding with rising political tensions in Egypt. 
Prices further picked up when unrest escalated 
three weeks later in Libya. Political uncertainty, 
surrounding both the transition to a stable political 
situation and the possibility that the uprising may 
further spread across the region, is likely to 
maintain upward pressures on oil prices in the 
period ahead. The effects of the dramatic events 
currently unfolding in Japan are difficult to assess 
at this juncture.  
Graph II.2: Oil price and euro-area energy 
price index (Jan 1996 to Feb 2011) 
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Source: Eurostat, Ecowin 
While the present increase in oil prices certainly 
stands out, other commodities have also been 
affected by upward price pressures. A 
combination of weather-related declines in 
agricultural production in different parts of the 
world and demand pressures has driven up food 
commodity prices in recent months. In early 
March 2011, wheat prices (on the Chicago Board 
of Trade) were about 50 % higher than twelve 
months earlier. Corn prices more than doubled 
over the same period. The outlook for the world 
cereals markets in 2010/2011 suggests that prices 
will stay high with world cereal stocks remaining 
much lower than at the end of last year.  
For industrial metals, price increases over the last 
12 months range from +15 % for zinc to over 40 % 
for copper and nickel. China remains a dominant 
factor behind this surge. Aluminium, copper, 
nickel, steel and iron ore prices were all driven up 
by either Chinese demand or production cutbacks 
(in the case of aluminium). Steel prices also 
soared following devastating floods in Australia, 
which hit supply.  
At the same time precious metals have also 
reached or come close to new peak price levels, in 
many cases driven by safe haven purchases 
against the background of a still fragile economic 
recovery marked by high uncertainty. Over the 
past year gold and silver prices climbed by 25 % 
and 95 % respectively and these metals are 
currently trading at all-time highs. 
While upstream price pressures have intensified, 
core inflation, which excludes the most volatile 
price components (i.e. energy and unprocessed 
food) and provides an approximate measure of 
underlying price dynamics, has so far remained 
subdued and below historical averages. Headline 
HICP excluding energy and unprocessed food 
stood at 1.1 % in February. Core inflation is at the 
current juncture subject to diverging forces. On 
the one hand, the indirect impact of recent energy 
price increases, already visible in producer prices, 
can be expected to gradually feed through. 
Upward pressures could be exacerbated if second-
round effects were to materialise. On the other 
hand, the large negative output gap should weigh 
on prices and wages. However, the early 
bottoming-out of core inflation in 2010 despite a 
still large and only slowly closing negative output 
gap is a puzzle. This particular aspect is examined 
in more depth in the next sub-section.  
II.2. Stabilisation of core inflation despite 
a still large estimated output gap 
The economic and financial crisis of 2007-2009 
has resulted in a large output gap that is only 
gradually closing. According to the Commission’s 
autumn 2010 forecasts, the output gap of the euro 
area reached a trough of -3.8 % in 2009 and is 
projected to remain sizeably negative for some 
time, reaching -1.6 % in 2012. For comparison, 
the OECD Economic Outlook of November 2010 
sees the euro-area output gap at -4.9 % in 2009 
and -2.7 % in 2012. (13) Yet, euro-area core 
inflation area has been remarkably stable. From a 
peak at 2.7 % in March 2008 it has fallen to a 
trough of 0.8 % in April 2010 and since then 
gradually climbed back to 1.1 % in February 
2011.  
The relative stability of core inflation in the face 
of a large negative output gap may hold 
interesting lessons about inflation dynamics in the 
euro area. Recent studies (14) examining why core 
                                                        
(13) It should be stressed, however, that contemporaneous 
estimates of the output gap are notoriously fraught with 
uncertainty and subject to often substantial revisions. 
(14) e.g. Meier, A. (2010), ‘Still minding the gap — Inflation 
dynamics during episodes of persistent large output gaps’,  
II. Inflation developments in the euro area 
 
- 17 -
inflation has not fallen further during the crisis or 
in its aftermath point to downward nominal wage 
and price rigidities in addition to well-anchored 
inflation expectations as possible factors that 
prevent core inflation from falling below a low 
positive value. 
Graph II.3: Core inflation, expectations and the 
output gap (in %) (1) 
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(1) Inflation and expectations: percentage annual change; output 
gap: percent of GDP. 
Source: Eurostat, DG ECFIN, Consensus forecast. 
As the above-mentioned studies lack either a 
euro-area focus or a rigorous econometric 
analysis, this section opts for an estimated Phillips 
curve framework to further examine the 
relationship between euro-area core inflation and 
the output gap and inflation expectations (see 
Box II.1 for a more technical discussion). The 
chosen framework allows to answer two specific 
questions. First, can observed inflation 
expectations help better understand inflation 
dynamics? Second, can a simple linear Phillips 
curve account for euro-area inflation dynamics, in 
particular in the light of the large negative output 
gap observed at present? If prices rise more 
strongly in reaction to a boom (positive output 
gap) than they fall in reaction to a bust (negative 
output gap), this should be reflected in a Phillips 
curve that is asymmetric with respect to the output 
gap. (15)  
The econometric analysis of the euro-area Philips 
curve confirms that the output gap is a relevant 
driver of inflation in the euro area. Its impact is, 
                                                                                  
International Monetary Fund Working Paper, No 10/189; 
Schumacher, D. and N. Kojucharov (2010), ‘The puzzling 
behaviour of core inflation’, Goldman Sachs European 
Weekly Analyst, No 10/32. 
(15) An important strand of the literature examines the issue of 
asymmetry. See e.g. Laxton, R, D. Rose and R. Tetlow 
(1993), ‘Monetary policy, uncertainty and the presumption of 
linearity’, Bank of Canada Technical Report, No 63; 
Buchmann, M. (2009), ‘Nonparametric hybrid Phillips curves 
based on subjective expectations: Estimates for the euro 
area’, European Central Bank Working Paper, No 1119. 
however, not very large, and there is some 
evidence that it has decreased over time: the euro-
area Phillips curve has flattened. (16) As far as 
inflation persistence and the role of expectations 
are concerned, the analysis concludes in favour of 
a so-called hybrid Phillips curve, which includes 
both past inflation and inflation expectations. The 
estimation results do not make it possible to 
conclude firmly in favour of either linearity or 
non-linearity of the Phillips curve. Both a linear 
specification and one where inflation depends on 
an exponential function of the output gap seem to 
describe the behaviour of euro-area core inflation 
over the past two decades reasonably well. 
Finally, there is some evidence that crude oil 
prices impact core inflation with a lag of four 
quarters. (17)  
Graph II.4: Simulation of core inflation with 
different model specifications 
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To illustrate these points, four specifications of 
the estimated euro-area Phillips curve retained 
from the quantitative analysis are subjected to a 
simulation exercise (Graph I.4). (18) This makes it 
possible to examine how different specifications 
can explain the behaviour of core inflation during 
the period of accelerating price dynamics in 2006-
2008Q1 and the subsequent crisis, in particular 
the bottoming-out of core inflation in 2010. These  
                                                        
(16) This is a widespread empirical observation also outside the 
euro area. 
(17) While the pass-through of oil prices to headline inflation is 
quite fast (see Box I.3), energy price variations are by 
definition excluded from core inflation. Oil prices can 
nonetheless impact core inflation indirectly, via their impact 
on intermediate costs and through second-round wage effects. 
(18) In contrast to an examination of model fit (where the 
differences across the model specifications are minor), the 
simulation uses for the lagged core inflation term the 
simulated value for the previous quarter, while actual values 
(forecast values after 2010Q4) are used for the other elements 
(i.e. for inflation expectations, the output gap and oil prices). 
In this way, simulated core inflation is not systematically 
‘pulled back’ to the actual value through its autoregressive 
term, which allows the inflation dynamics implicit in each of 
the specifications to be judged better. 
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 Box II.1: Estimation of a euro-area Phillips curve
This box presents estimations of the Philips curve for the euro area. Two aspects are of particular interest for the 
empirical analysis of the euro-area Phillips curve against the backdrop of recent extreme realisations of the output 
gap and the relative stability of core inflation. First, is the Phillips curve linear or convex? Second, what role do 
inflation expectations play for euro-area inflation dynamics?  
I II III IV
Baseline Flattened Exponential With oil price
Sample period 1991q1 - 2010q4 2000q1 - 2010q4 1991q1 - 2010q4 1991q1 - 2010q4
Core inflation lagged one quarter 0.830*** 0.881*** 0.799*** 0.776***
Inflation expectations 0.164* 0.143** 0.179*** 0.199***
Output gap 0.071*** 0.038*** 0.033*
EXP (output gap) 0.057***
Constant -0.072
Oil price change lagged four quarters 0.002***
R² 0.97 0.88 0.97 0.95
J statistic 0.046 0.09 0.049 0.030
*, **, *** denote significance at 5, 2 and 1% confidence level
Source: Commission services
Estimation by GMM. Dependent variable: core inflation. Instruments: First lag of output gap; first and second lags of inflation expectations; short-term interest rates and 
their first lag; change in the rate of capacity utilisation; oil price change; fifth lag of oil price change (the latter two for panel IV only).
Phillips curves - Estimation output
(endogenous variable: core inflation)
The first aspect is addressed by estimating different functional forms of the Phillips curve explicitly. This is more
restrictive than estimating Phillips curves non-parametrically, which is the subject of a recent strand of the literature.
However, the latter approach would overly complicate the analysis of the other issues of interest here.  
To analyse the role of inflation expectations, observed expectations from Consensus forecasts are used, thus avoiding
any assumptions about the way expectations are formed. This approach has been followed only in a small minority of
analyses of the Phillips curve so far.1 Most empirical studies of the Phillips curve use inflation expectations that are
derived from actual realisations of inflation under different assumptions concerning expectation formation.  
In the same vein, no assumption is imposed about the role of past realisations of inflation (which could reflect
adaptive expectations, indexation or ‘sticky information’) in the Philips curve.  
Finally, in line with the analytical focus of this exercise, the output gap is chosen as the driving variable. In the New-
Keynesian Phillips curve, the driving variable is the marginal cost. While the debate on the most appropriate way of
modelling (unobservable) marginal cost in empirical analyses is ongoing, the performance of the output gap as a good
proxy for the marginal cost in the euro-area Phillips curve is well documented.  
Given the aim to better understand its dynamics, core inflation is used as a dependent variable in this analysis. In the
empirical literature, different concepts of inflation ranging from the GDP deflator and headline consumer price
inflation to various measures of core inflation have been used.  
In the light of the above considerations, the baseline specification of the euro-area Phillips curve is as follows:  
  tttftbt mcF λπγπγπ ++= +− 11     (1) 
This is the hybrid (new-Keynesian) Phillips curve formulated by Galí and Gertler2 with the important modification
that the (rational) expectations operator E(.) is replaced with average observed expectations F(.).3 
Data are quarterly and cover the period 1990q1 to 2010q4. Core inflation (i.e. HICP excluding energy and
unprocessed food) is from Eurostat while inflation expectations are from Consensus Forecasts and the output gap
from the Commission.  
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                         
1  Paloviita, M. (2008), ‘Estimating open economy Phillips curves for the euro area with directly measured expectations’, Bank of 
Finland Research Discussion Paper, No 16/2008 and Henzel, S. and T. Wollmershaeuser (2008), ‘The new Keynesian Phillips 
curve and the role of expectations: Evidence from the IFO World Economic Survey’, Economic Modelling, No 25(5), pp. 811-
832 are recent examples. 
2  Galí, J. and M. Gertler (1999), ‘Inflation dynamics: A structural econometric analysis’, Journal of Monetary Economics, 
No 44(2), pp. 195-222. 
3  See Henzel and Wollmershaeuser (2008), op cit.  
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four specifications are (see also the table 
displayed in Box II.1): (I) a linear Phillips curve 
(labelled baseline in Graph II.4), (II) the same 
linear Phillips curve estimated over a shorter 
sample to reflect its flattening with respect to the 
output gap, (III) a non-linear (exponential) 
Phillips curve and, finally, (IV) an extension of 
the baseline linear model with lagged crude oil 
prices. 
As shown in Graph II.4, all model variants track 
the main developments of core inflation since late 
2005 reasonably well, though all feature the 
turning points in 2008 and 2010 with a delay. This 
notwithstanding, each model does rightly indicate 
a bottoming-out of core inflation in 2010. The 
undershooting of the baseline model (I) indicates 
the relevance of the flattening of the Phillips 
curve. The non-linear specification overshoots 
actual core inflation at the peak in early 2008, and 
it behaves very like the flattened linear model in 
the downturn. The version augmented with lagged 
oil prices falls below actual core inflation but 
displays the strongest upturn.  
On balance, the simulation demonstrates that the 
stabilisation of core inflation in 2010 can be 
captured reasonably well by a simple Phillips 
curve relationship, which explicitly takes 
observed inflation expectations into account. The 
simulation further suggests that either a flattening 
of the (linear) Phillips curve or its convexity 
contributed to the stability of core inflation during 
the crisis. (19) However, as none of the model 
variants is precise concerning the timing of the 
trough, additional factors are likely to have been 
at work. These might include possible 
underestimations of the output gap (i.e. an output 
                                                        
(19) Whether the true model behind euro-area inflation dynamics 
is linear and ‘flattened’ or convex cannot be decided on the 
basis of this simple analysis. 
gap that is in reality less negative than currently 
estimated) after a major crisis which forced 
structural adjustments leading to e.g. a higher than 
usual depreciation of the capital stock.  
With respect to 2011, all specifications would 
predict a gradual further normalisation of core 
inflation. This corroborates the assessment in the 
Commission’s interim forecast of March 2011 
that core inflation will continue to increase 
slowly. The output gap will continue to exert a 
downward pull on core inflation for some time, 
while inflation expectations and the indirect effect 
of oil prices will not only prevent core inflation 
from falling but on balance push it higher. 
II.3. The contribution of the oil price 
surge to inflation differentials within 
the euro area  
Member State inflation differentials 
Inflation picked up across the whole euro area, 
albeit to a different extent. Annual inflation rates 
increased in ten euro-area Member States in 
February, with fifteen Member States witnessing 
inflation rates at or above 2 %, ten of which with 
rates higher than 3 %. Estonia recorded the highest 
rate (5.5 %), followed by Greece (4.2 %) and 
Luxembourg (3.9 %). Belgium, Portugal, Slovakia 
and Finland all had an inflation rate of 3.5 %. 
Ireland closed the ranking with an annual inflation 
rate of 0.9 %, after having re-entered positive 
territory in January 2011 for the first time since 
March 2009, i.e. after 22 months. As discussed 
further in the remainder of this section, these 
divergences reflect a range of factors including 
country differences in terms of growth, tax policy 
and the impact of higher commodity prices.  
Box (continued) 
 
 In addition to specification (1), two extensions are examined.  
  cmcEXPF tttftbt +++= +− )()( 11 λπγπγπ    (2) 
  ∑ −+− +++=
i
ititttftbt OILmcF βλπγπγπ 11    (3) 
(2) is a non-linear version of the Phillips curve using the exponential function1 of the output gap and adding a 
constant to account for the possible asymmetric effect of the output gap. Specification (3) is the baseline 
specification extended with lagged crude oil prices. Results are summarised in the table.  
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                         
1  This follows the specification suggested in Laxton, R, D. Rose and R. Tetlow (1993), ‘Monetary policy, uncertainty and the 
presumption of linearity’, Bank of Canada Technical Report, No 63. Quadratic and cubic functional forms were also tested but 
were not found to be statistically superior and are not reported here.  
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Price and inflation differentials are a natural 
occurrence in a currency union where national 
monetary and exchange rate policies cannot be 
employed to adjust to shocks. To the extent that 
these differentials reflect a country’s longer-term 
convergence towards the rest of the area or 
medium-term adjustments to idiosyncratic shocks, 
they can play an important stabilisation role and 
may help reduce heterogeneities, thus eventually 
improving the efficiency of area-wide economic 
policies.  
After a phase of substantial convergence in the 
run-up to the euro’s introduction, euro-area 
inflation differentials have increased again and 
remained relatively high since the launch of the 
single currency. Moreover, there is substantial 
evidence that the inflation differentials observed 
 
 
 Box II.2: Developments in the harmonised index of consumer prices at constant tax rates
Developments in the harmonised index of consumer prices at constant tax rates (HICP-CT) provide a somewhat 
different picture of inflation patterns in some countries. The HICP-CT, which has been released monthly by Eurostat 
since August 2009, makes it possible to examine the theoretical impact of changes in indirect taxes (e.g. VAT and 
excise duties) on overall inflation by measuring the change in prices ‘at constant tax rates’. Prices at constant tax 
rates for each individual month are computed by subtracting the taxes applicable in that month and adding the taxes 
according to the rates in force in the previous December. In effect, the difference between HICP and HICP-CT 
growth rates points to the theoretical impact of tax changes on overall HICP inflation, assuming instantaneous pass-
through of tax rate changes to the price paid by the consumer. The latter assumption may not hold. The difference 
between headline and constant-tax HICP measures should therefore be seen as an indication of the upper limit of the 
impact of changes in tax rates. 
HICP-CT inflation rates for January 2011 (latest available data) indeed reveal noteworthy discrepancies in some 
peripheral Member States, where the observed headline inflation rates reflect tax measures and thus hide to some 
extent an ongoing, and necessary, adjustment.  
HICP-CT and HICP inflation 
Y-o-y changes in January 2011 (in %) Differences between HICP and HICP-CT inflation, 
euro area, Greece, Spain, Portugal (in pp, Jan 2004-
Jan 2010) 
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For the euro area as a whole, the discrepancy between the two indices has never exceeded 0.5 pp and was 0.4 pp in 
January 2011, when constant-tax inflation stood at 1.9 %, for a headline inflation of 2.3 %. In Greece, the gap 
between the two series has started to widen from February 2010 onwards, reflecting increases in VAT rates and 
excise duties. In January annual HICP-CT inflation stood at 0.2 %, 4.7 pp below the HICP inflation rate of 4.9 %, 
making Greece the euro-area Member State with the smallest price growth.1 For Spain and Portugal the wedge has 
become more visible from July 2010 onwards. Since then the Spanish HICP rate has exceeded the constant tax 
inflation rate by about 1.1 pp. In January, the HICP-CT rate (1.8 %) was 1.2 pp below the headline figure (3.0 %). 
Portugal’s inflation rate has exceeded the constant tax equivalent by around 0.7 pp since July 2010. The January 
HICP-CT inflation rate of 2.1 % compared to a headline HICP rate of 3.6 %. Dispersion measures have generally 
been lower for HICP-CT inflation than for HICP inflation. This has in particular been the case since 2009, 
suggesting that some of the recent observed inflation dispersion can be traced back to indirect taxes. 
                                                          
1 HICP-CT data for Ireland are not available.  
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over the past decade have not always contributed 
to economic convergence within EMU, and their 
persistence and size warrant permanent 
monitoring. (20) 
Graph II.5: HICP inflation differentials 
between euro-area Member States  
(various measures, Jan 2000 to Feb 2011) 
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(1) Difference between the lowest and the highest inflation rate in 
the euro area.
(2) Difference between the first and the third quartile. 
Source: Commission services. 
Euro-area inflation dispersion — measured by 
either the range, the interquartile range or the 
standard deviation — has increased markedly 
with the outbreak of the economic financial crisis 
and the large oil price swings that accompanied it 
(Graph I.3). In the course of 2010, differentials 
contracted somewhat, but currently remain above 
their pre-crisis period or historical averages.  
At the current juncture, there are some indications 
that national inflation patterns, once adjusted for 
tax changes or the effect of commodity prices, 
reflect mostly growth differences and therefore 
have started to contribute to the adjustment to 
macroeconomic imbalances (see Box II.2 for a 
discussion of the importance of tax changes), but 
this process is only beginning. Core inflation at 
the Member State level since mid-2008 has 
responded to competitiveness imbalances, as 
shown in graph II.6. (21)  
The inflation dispersion measures are lower for 
core inflation than for headline inflation, 
suggesting that non-core items, and in particular 
energy, are major drivers of the observed 
differentials.  
                                                        
(20) See European Commission, ‘EMU@10, Successes and 
challenges after 10 years of Economic and Monetary Union’, 
European Economy, No 2, 2008. 
(21) Competitiveness imbalances here signify the estimated over- 
or undervaluation of the real effective exchange rate. See also 
Quarterly Report on the Euro Area, 2009, Vol. 8, No. 1, p. 
40.  
Graph II.6: Core inflation since mid-2008 
against the estimated misalignment of the REER 
in 2009 
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The impact of oil price developments on 
Member States’ inflation 
Energy price developments are a major driver of 
cross-country inflation differentials. Although the 
oil price surge is a global event, it has impacted 
energy and headline inflation at the level of 
Member States in an asymmetric manner. In 
February 2011, fourteen Member States 
experienced energy inflation in the two-digit 
range. Greece headed the ranking with an annual 
price increase of 25.9 %, followed by Cyprus 
(19.8 %) and Spain (19.0 %). Annual energy 
inflation in Slovakia, which was actually negative 
until December 2010, rebounded in January and 
reached 10.3 % in February. The lowest energy 
inflation rates were observed in the Netherlands 
(7.5 %), Estonia (8.6 %) and Italy (9.9 %). 
It is noteworthy that the cross-country dispersion 
of energy inflation, which is generally 
considerably higher than for headline inflation, 
increased substantially with the 2008 oil price 
rally. Energy is the HICP sub-index which has 
experienced the fastest average growth of all main 
euro-area HICP categories since 1999. It is also 
the most volatile category and has reached the 
most extreme values, covering a range of over 
31 pp from -14.4 % (July 2009) to +17.1 % (July 
2008). This extreme volatility is also visible at 
Member State level: since the introduction of the 
euro, annual energy inflation has climbed as high 
as 37.9 % (Greece in May 2010, largely reflecting 
the increase in excise duties on fuel) and fallen as 
low as –23.2 % (Belgium in July 2009) (see 
Table I.1). In five euro-area Member States, the 
difference between the highest and the lowest 
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annual energy inflation rate has exceeded 50 pp. 
The volatility of annual energy inflation as 
measured by the standard deviation (Table II.1) 
was highest in Slovakia, followed by Greece, 
Cyprus and Luxembourg. 
 
Table II.1: Miscellaneous statistics on annual 
energy inflation (in %, Feb 1996 to Jan 2011) 
Mean Median Maximum Minimum Range Std Dev
EA 4.0 3.3 17.1 -14.4 31.5 6.4
BE 4.4 3.5 31.5 -23.2 54.7 9.9
DE 4.5 4.1 17.8 -11.4 29.2 6.1
EE 8.8 9.4 30.0 -8.0 37.9 8.5
IE 4.9 4.6 20.0 -13.4 33.4 6.8
EL 5.7 2.7 38.0 -19.5 57.5 12.4
ES 4.1 3.5 21.3 -15.8 37.1 7.8
FR 3.2 1.9 18.4 -17.5 35.9 7.3
IT 3.0 2.9 16.6 -14.6 31.1 6.0
CY 7.6 8.0 35.3 -21.5 56.8 11.7
LU 4.7 4.8 26.8 -23.6 50.4 11.1
MT 7.1 6.3 29.2 -12.0 41.2 8.9
NL 5.2 4.8 18.2 -13.3 31.4 5.6
AT 3.4 3.4 20.0 -15.8 35.8 7.2
PT 4.0 3.8 14.7 -12.4 27.1 5.7
SI 7.4 8.4 24.9 -11.9 36.8 7.5
SK 12.3 6.1 72.0 -1.8 73.8 16.6
FI 4.0 3.3 21.4 -14.0 35.4 7.0
Source: Commission services. 
 
Determinants of energy inflation differentials 
The differentiated impact of oil price fluctuations 
on euro-area Member States’ headline inflation 
reflects, to some extent, different weights of 
energy products in the respective HICP baskets. 
As a result, even a symmetric rise in energy 
inflation affects households across the euro area 
and Member States’ headline inflation in a 
differentiated manner. On average, euro-area 
households devote around 9.6 % of their 
outgoings to energy items. The bulk of this is 
spent on ‘fuels for personal transport’, followed 
by ‘electricity’ and ‘gas’. In 2010, households in 
Malta (6.3 %) and Greece (7.2 %) spent 
proportionally the least on energy, while Slovak 
(15.7 %) and Slovenian (13.9 %) households spent 
the most (Graph II.7). The respective 
consumption baskets also differ in that some sub-
items (e.g. ‘gas’ or ‘heat energy’) carry zero 
weight in some countries. 
In addition, global energy market developments 
(in particular crude oil prices) impact on domestic 
energy inflation in a differentiated manner across 
countries. Box I.3 presents estimates of the direct 
effect of changes in oil prices on energy inflation 
in the euro area as a whole and in individual 
Member States. The estimations show that the 
size and length of the pass-through varies across 
Member States, explaining much of the observed 
dispersion of energy inflation. For the euro area, 
the results suggest that an EUR 1 increase in the 
oil price raises quarterly energy inflation 
immediately by 0.37 pp. In addition, the oil price 
increase still impacts energy inflation four 
quarters later. These long lags are likely to result 
from indexed prices or contracts, which are 
common practice for items such as natural gas. 
They are visible in most Member States. In the 
case of Greece, Cyprus or Estonia, however, the 
impact seems to be more short-lived and over 
after one quarter. 
A number of factors can explain the different 
pass-through at Member State level. First, 
structural characteristics, such as the energy 
intensity, play a role. These reflect different 
production structures as well as differences in 
energy efficiency and energy dependency (the 
share of imported energy). Second, energy taxes 
also affect energy prices and intra-euro area 
inflation differentials. (22) Finally, both energy 
price levels and inflation rates are affected by the 
functioning of the markets for electricity and gas. 
Discrepancies may exist as regards the degree of 
competition on energy markets, the existence of 
regulated tariffs, the capacities for cross-border 
trade, and the level and design of support schemes 
for renewable energy. 
Graph II.7: Weight of energy in the HICP 
basket, euro-area Member States (in %, 2010) 
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Source: Eurostat. 
                                                        
(22) The level of excise duties on fuels differs across Member 
States (and fuel categories). Because they are calculated on 
volumes of energy rather than values, excise duties drive a 
wedge between the percentage change in the price of the 
taxed item and the percentage change in its after-tax price. 
The effect is, however, smaller the higher the initial price. 
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II.4. The short-term outlook for euro-area 
inflation 
A look at producer prices indicates that upstream 
price pressures intensified in the months to 
January (latest observation), with inflation 
climbing to 6.1 %. While this increase was broad-
based across sub-categories, annual energy 
inflation stood out, after increasing to 12.5 % in 
January following a 3.0 % monthly price increase. 
Surveys also suggest that producer price pressures 
will continue to build up over the months 
 
 
 Box II.3: The effect of changes in oil prices on euro-area energy inflation
This box presents a simple analysis of the pass-through of changes in oil prices to energy inflation in the euro area 
and individual Member States. Using an auto-regressive distributed lag model,1 quarterly energy inflation (q-o-q 
percentage change) is regressed on level changes in euro-denominated Brent oil prices and a number of its lags. The 
results are reported in the table below.  
EA BE DE EE IE EL ES FR IT CY LU MT NL AY PT SI FI
Constant 0.44 0.42 0.61 1.78 0.68 0.69 0.60 0.37 0.22 1.15 0.53 1.39 0.83 0.36 0.43 0.90 1.02
3.03 1.79 2.92 4.53 2.76 1.68 2.82 2.09 1.96 2.88 1.56 3.22 2.72 1.96 1.77 3.36 3.74
∆_Oil price 0.37 0.47 0.35 0.17 0.32 0.63 0.48 0.37 0.27 0.42 0.58 0.26 0.39 0.30 0.44 0.46
14.96 12.18 10.53 3.11 8.24 9.47 14.15 12.92 14.36 6.43 10.88 6.34 13.00 8.43 13.29 11.13
∆_Oil price (-1) 0.10 0.27 0.22 0.21 0.15 0.22 0.28 0.16 0.44 0.38 0.44 0.23 0.26
3.72 3.60 4.06 5.06 2.26 3.18 4.70 8.17 6.80 4.03 6.31 4.03 3.62
∆_Oil price (-2) 0.07 0.38 0.09 0.09 0.11 0.07 0.08 0.21
2.37 4.93 2.42 2.29 3.40 3.23 2.25 2.84
∆_Oil price (-3) 0.08 0.20 0.08 0.09 0.08 0.06 0.24 0.12
2.94 4.10 2.44 2.33 2.63 3.20 5.65 3.10
∆_Oil price (-4) 0.05 0.16 0.07 0.08 0.08 0.11 0.08 0.11
2.16 3.03 2.02 2.44 4.32 2.03 2.63 2.82
Lags of dep. variable 1,2 1 1 1 1,4 1 3 4 1,2
# of obs. 55 55 55 40 56 58 55 56 55 58 55 58 55 55 56 40 55
adj. R2 0.85 0.82 0.68 0.44 0.67 0.65 0.83 0.83 0.88 0.66 0.76 0.41 0.58 0.82 0.61 0.83 0.79
specification. Insignificant regressors were dropped from the model. Numbers in italic refer to t-values. The Slovakian energy price index exhibits no evident 
relationship with oil prices under this particular specification; results are consequently not reported.
Oil price pass-through to energy inflation 
Estimation results
Source: Commission services
(1) Data are quarterly and cover the period from Q1 1996 to Q1 2009. Inflation is measured as quarter-on-quarter percentage changes in the price index. Oil
price changes are expressed as quarterly changes in euro-denominated levels. Contemporaneous oil price changes and six lags were included in the original
The first column of the table shows the results for the euro area as a whole. Changes in the oil price have 
contemporaneous as well as lagged effects on euro-area energy inflation: an EUR 1 oil price increase translates into 
an immediate increase of 0.37 pp in the q-o-q energy inflation rate. Furthermore, energy inflation is still affected up 
to four quarters after the initial oil price change. Estimating the model on a shorter sample (until Q4 of 2007) 
suggests that the direct pass-through was stronger in pre-crisis years in the euro area.2 
The regressions at Member State level suggest that the speed and magnitude of the pass-through varies quite 
substantially across Member States. In the case of Greece, for example, the immediate effect of an EUR 1 rise in the 
oil price is strongest, raising quarterly energy inflation by 0.63 pp. Greece is followed by Luxembourg (0.58 pp), 
Spain (0.48 pp) and Belgium (0.48 pp). Analogously, the immediate pass-through is smallest for the Member States 
currently witnessing the lowest energy inflation rates, i.e. Italy (0.27 pp) and the Netherlands (0.26 pp). In the case 
of Malta, oil price changes only seem to affect inflation with a one-quarter delay.  
The table also shows that the dynamic impact of an oil price change differs throughout the euro area. While in the 
case of Greece and Estonia most of the impact of an oil price increase affects energy inflation instantaneously, 
energy inflation in Belgium, Germany, Spain, Italy, Luxembourg, Austria and Finland is still affected four quarters 
later by oil price movements — even if the magnitude of the coefficients is often relatively low. A possible 
explanation for the long lags has to do with the composition of the energy basket and in particular the relative 
importance of ‘gas’ and ‘heat energy’ — subcategories in which the pass-through is generally slower. Indeed, gas 
prices are often indexed to the oil price or periodically revised. 
                                                          
1 Applying the same methodology as in QREA Vol. 7 No 1 (2008). 
2 The coefficient on the contemporaneous variable was 0.5, while the lagged oil price was insignificant.  
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ahead. (23) However, labour cost indicators remain 
subdued, reflecting the overall still weak labour 
market conditions across the euro-area economy. 
The recent increase in inflation has translated into 
a rise in survey- and market-based inflation 
expectations. Long-term inflation expectations, as 
measured by the difference between German 
nominal and inflation-linked long-term 
government bond yields (maturity 2016), have 
picked up since November, when they averaged 
1.54 %. (24) In January they averaged 1.85 % and 
further climbed to 1.96 % in February. In early 
March they stood at 2.05 %. This level remains 
lower than in the pre-crisis period (in 2007 long-
term inflation expectations averaged 2.12 %), 
suggesting that inflation expectations remain 
overall well anchored, thus keeping underlying 
inflationary pressures in check. The recent 
increase nonetheless highlights the need to closely 
onitor expectations and to prevent second-round 
effects. 
Survey data suggest that consumers in the euro 
area expect prices to rise in the short term too: the 
balance statistic in ECFIN’s Consumer Survey 
rose from 20.9 in January to 25.7 in February, 
substantially exceeding the average level of the 
series since 1999 of 15.5. (25) 
Recent commodity price developments have 
prompted an upward revision of inflation 
forecasts released by the end of 2010. The 
political uncertainty in the Middle East and in 
North African countries and the repercussions of 
the earthquake in Japan on 11 March are likely to 
substantially complicate oil price forecasts in the 
period ahead — and thus the conditioning 
assumptions underlying (energy) inflation 
forecasts.  
The euro-area inflation projection in the 
Commission’s interim forecast, released on  
                                                        
(23) The Commission’s monthly industry survey asks participants 
about the expected change in their selling prices over the next 
three months. 
(24) Inflation expectations derived from financial instruments 
should be analysed with care as they may be distorted by 
changes in liquidity and risk premia. 
(25) Question 6 in the Commission’s monthly consumer survey 
asks participants about their expectations regarding price 
developments over the coming 12 months. 
1 March 2011, has been revised up markedly 
compared to the autumn forecast of November 
2010. HICP inflation is now projected at 2.2 % 
(up 0.4 pp relative to the previous forecast) in the 
euro area. On a quarterly basis, the interim 
forecast projects a peak in headline inflation in the 
first quarter of 2011 at 2.3 % in the euro area and 
a gradual decrease towards 2 % by the end of the 
year. This profile reflects the diminishing effects 
of pass-through from both the surge in commodity 
prices at the turn of the year and statistical base 
effects exerting downward pressure on inflation 
for most of 2011. It is also noteworthy that the 
inflation profile is partly affected by the impact of 
planned increases in indirect taxes and 
administered prices in some euro-area Member 
States.  
Despite the recent upward revisions to headline 
inflation forecasts, the underlying inflation trends 
identified in the 2010 autumn forecast remain 
valid. The lingering slack in the economy and the 
overall weak labour market conditions are 
expected to keep the underlying inflationary 
pressures contained. Nevertheless, core inflation 
is expected to rise slowly in line with the pick-up 
in activity and possibly due to higher imported 
inflation from emerging-market economies. In 
contrast, the headline rate may prove to be volatile 
in the course of 2011, driven by changes in 
commodity prices linked to the outlook for 
advanced economies, geopolitical tensions and 
base effects. 
The ongoing necessary correction of imbalances 
within the euro area and the differences in the 
speed of recovery, notably regarding the closure 
of the national output gaps, are likely to keep 
inflation dispersion high in the period ahead. This 
should not be a cause of concern, in so far as it 
reflects the rectification of previous divergence 
processes. As far as core inflation is concerned a 
gradual normalisation can be expected. 
III. Special topics on the euro-area economy 
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Economic impact of changes in capital requirements in the euro-area banking sector 
Increased capital requirements for banks are a central plank of the policies aimed at strengthening the banking 
sector and making it more resilient to shocks. The first section of this chapter presents an analysis of the 
macro-economic effects of increased capital requirements for banks, using a DSGE model for the euro area 
with a banking sector and bank capital. According to simulation results, higher capital requirements may 
entail some GDP losses over time because of higher lending costs; however, these are likely to remain small 
and would be associated with a significant reduction in GDP volatility. A 1 pp increase in the share of Tier 1 
capital to total assets could reduce the level of GDP by about 0.15 % after 8 years. The simulations stress two 
mitigating factors. First, a reduction in deposit rates, which partly offsets the cost increase that would result 
from higher capital requirements, and, second, a move towards higher rates of self-financing. It is important to 
stress that a degree of uncertainty surrounds these estimates, stemming principally from the ambiguous 
response of the return on equity (ROE). On balance, it appears reasonable to expect no large impact on the 
ROE.  
Estonia in the euro area: staying fit in monetary union 
The second section reviews the path towards the adoption of the euro in Estonia. Against the prospect of 
joining first the EU, then the euro area, Estonia experienced fast economic and financial convergence 
supported by high economic growth and declining unemployment. However, excessive credit growth fuelled 
domestic demand and contributed to the emergence of significant macro-economic imbalances. The effect of 
the unwinding of these imbalances was amplified by the global economic crisis, which made the challenge to 
join the euro area almost daunting. Still, nominal convergence was achieved following impressive 
consolidation and the structural reforms undertaken over the past two years. Currently Estonia is going 
through a significant adjustment process. Measures introduced to ensure flexible labour markets and prudent 
fiscal and financial policies are already contributing to a fast recovery and sectoral rebalancing, brightening 
the prospects for resuming real convergence and successful economic performance of Estonia in the euro area. 
Overall, the recent Estonian experience shows that policies can make a difference. 
Dissecting the recovery with survey data 
The third section in this chapter looks into the ongoing recovery through the lens of survey data. Business and 
consumer survey data are an important tool to track features of the business cycle that cannot always be easily 
measured with hard data. Survey data show that the ongoing recovery – which began in spring 2009 –has been 
closely synchronised across sectors but has also been unbalanced – mostly driven by industry – and associated 
with unusually sluggish GDP growth. At this stage, sentiment indicators do not send clear signals of having 
reached a peak, suggesting that the recovery remains on track. Nevertheless, a systematic comparison with 
developments in sentiment in the aftermath of the 1992-93 recession points to a number of patterns in the 
recovery from the latest recession. These include lingering uncertainties among households – about their 
financial situation, unemployment risks and general economic prospects –,weak investment plans in industry 
and evidence that the crisis may have brought about losses in production capacity. Finally, the recovery is also 
characterised by unusually marked differences in the pick-up of activity across countries, a factor that calls for 
differentiated policy approaches across the euro area. 
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III.1. Economic impact of changes in 
capital requirements in the euro-
area banking sector  
Introduction 
The recent financial crisis has shown that highly 
leveraged financial institutions are insufficiently 
robust to withstand loan losses and/or write downs 
of asset values. The systemic risks associated with 
highly leveraged financial institutions led the 
Basel Committee on Banking Supervision 
(BCBS) (26) to propose in 2009 that capital 
requirements (CR) of commercial banks be 
increased. While higher capital standards make 
banks more resilient in times of asset losses, this 
comes possibly at the price of on average higher 
lending rates if regulation imposes higher funding 
costs on banks.  
These new CR rules have prompted intensive 
discussions about their possible economic impact. 
For example, the Institute of International Finance 
(IIF), which is closely linked to the banking 
industry, estimates that an increase in capital 
requirements of 2 pp would reduce GDP in the 
EU by 4.1 % (after 4 years) and increase loan 
interest rates by 130 bp. Also the BCBS has 
brought together a group of economists from 
central banks and international organisations, the 
Macroeconomic Assessment Group (MAG), to 
provide an estimate of GDP losses. They come to 
a very different result and only estimate a GDP 
loss of 0.3 %. This paper presents results from the 
DG ECFIN’s QUEST model and compares them 
to the results from other studies. 
The role of macroprudential policy 
A case for macroprudential policy or regulation of 
banks can be made if shocks originating in the 
financial sector have large spillover effects onto 
the rest of the economy. This has indeed happened 
with the current financial crisis and seems to be a 
pervasive feature of many financial and banking 
crises. There is now ample empirical evidence 
that financial crises are associated with a 
persistent drop in output. One of the factors that 
can explain this persistence is that adverse shocks 
to financial institutions become ‘systemic’, which 
means that there are mechanisms which allow 
shocks, initially only affecting individual banks or 
segments of the financial market, to spread 
throughout the financial system and weigh heavily 
                                                        
(26) BCBS (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision) (2009), 
‘Strengthening the resilience of the banking sector’, 
consultative document, Basel. 
on its capacity to supply loans and thereby on 
economic growth.  
Broadly speaking, two types of market failures 
can be distinguished: incentive problems and 
coordination failures. Both types of market failure 
justify policy intervention, in general because of 
resulting economic inefficiencies and more 
particularly with a view to minimise systemic 
risks. Incentive problems can arise because public 
insurance policies towards the banking system in 
the form of (implicit) bail-out guarantees or 
explicit deposit insurance can lead to excessive 
risk taking (see Wallace (27)). Coordination 
failures can arise because individual banks take 
insufficiently into account the fact that their 
balance sheet adjustments drive down asset prices 
and asset positions of other banks and force them 
to adjust. While incentive problems can lead to 
credit booms not justified by market fundamentals 
and thereby increase macroeconomic adjustment 
costs, coordination failures lead to unintended 
spillover effects across the financial system (see 
Wagner (2010) (28) for an overview of systemic 
externalities in financial markets). 
Rajan (1994) (29) provides an alternative 
explanation for excessive lending which is not 
based on moral hazard but rests on short horizons 
of bank managers who care about their reputation. 
He shows that they may be inclined to increase 
the supply of loans in order to conceal losses from 
bad loans.  
Higher capital requirements can in principle deal 
with these problems. They force banks to 
internalise potential losses and thereby reduce 
excessive risk taking. At the same time, higher 
capital requirements make banks more robust in 
the event of actual asset losses. For example, the 
Bank of England (2009) (30) estimates that with an 
initial Tier 1 capital ratio of 8.5 % Nordic and 
Japanese banks could have maintained a ratio of 
4 % during their banking crisis episodes of the 
1990s without additional recapitalisation efforts or 
government support. Also the stress tests 
conducted by the Fed for the largest 19 US banks 
in 2009 suggest that a Tier 1 capital ratio of 
around 8 % would be necessary for these 
                                                        
(27) Kareken, J. H. and N. Wallace (1978), ‘Deposit insurance 
and bank regulation: A partial-equilibrium exposition’, The 
Journal of Business, Vol. 51, pp. 413-438. 
(28) Wagner, W. (2010), ‘In the quest of systemic externalities: A 
review of the literature’, CESIfo Economic Studies, Vol. 56, 
pp. 96-111. 
(29) Rajan, R. (1994), ‘Why bank credit policies fluctuate: A 
theory and some evidence‘, Quarterly Journal of Economics 
Vol. 109, pp. 309-441. 
(30) Bank of England (2009), ‘The role of macroprudential 
policy’, Bank of England Discussion Paper, November 2009. 
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institutions to survive a deep and protracted 
economic downturn. It should, however, also be 
emphasised that tighter capital requirements may 
by itself not be enough to stabilise the financial 
system. For example, Shin (2010) (31) argues that 
greater "loss absorbancy" as envisaged by 
Basel III does not directly address excessive asset 
growth in booms which results from unstable 
short term wholesale funding, which makes banks 
vulnerable to large withdrawals in case risks 
emerge. 
The possible implications of increased capital 
requirements (in normal times)  
Increasing capital requirements induces banks to 
shift liabilities from debt (deposits) to bank 
equity. This can affect costs for banks in opposite 
directions. Keeping the rate of return on bank 
equity (ROE) and the deposit rate unchanged, an 
increase in capital requirements increases funding 
costs for banks because the ROE is substantially 
larger than the interest rate banks are paying for 
deposits. The cost-increasing composition effect 
is mitigated by a fall in banks’ demand for 
deposits as equity partly replaces deposits in 
banks liabilities. This causes deposit rates to 
decline, depending on the interest elasticity of the 
supply of deposits of households to banks.  
The major controversy is about the effect of 
higher CR on the ROE. While banks argue that 
higher capital requirements would likely be 
accompanied by an increase in ROE (see IIF 
(2009)) (32), the dominant view in the academic 
literature seems to be that an increase in CR is 
likely to be associated with a decline in ROE. For 
example, Admati et al. (2010) (33) argue that 
increased capital requirements would not increase 
funding costs for banks at all, i.e. the ROE would 
fall to fully compensate the composition effect. 
Their reasoning is based on the Modigliani-Miller 
(1958) theorem (M-M).  
Modigliani and Miller acknowledge that there is a 
return differential between ROE and the interest 
rate on other bank debt because bank equity is 
more risky. However, increasing the capital 
requirement keeps the total risk, which is related 
                                                        
(31) H.S. Shin (2010), ‘Macroprudential policies beyond 
Basel III‘, Policy Memo, Princeton University. 
(32) Institute of International Finance (IIF) (2009), ‘Interim report 
on the cumulative impact of proposed changes in the banking 
regulatory framework’. 
(33) Admati, A. R., P. M. DeMarzo, M. F. Hellwig and P. 
Pfleiderer (2010), ‘Fallacies, irrelevant facts, and myths in 
discussion of capital regulation: Why bank equity is not 
expensive’, Stanford GSB Research paper, No 2065. 
to bank’s asset returns, unchanged. (34) If risk is 
priced correctly, the risk per share will decline 
such that total funding costs of banks remain 
unchanged. Though M-M only holds under a 
certain set of conditions, Kashyap et al. (2010) (35) 
provide empirical evidence that there is a link 
between leverage and ROE for a panel of large 
banks.  
In contrast, the banking industry (see IIF (36)) 
argues that, because of frictions, it is costly for 
banks to raise a large amount of equity over a 
short period of time. There is some research 
which suggests that there may indeed be adverse 
selection problems and other frictions (see Myers 
and Majluf (1984)) (37) which make it difficult to 
raise new equity instead of accumulating it via 
retained earnings.  
As a compromise between these two opposing 
views and taking into account that a long 
transition period is granted to banks in order to 
allow them to use retained earnings as a means of 
raising capital standards, in this analysis it is 
assumed that the bank equity premium remains 
unchanged. This is also the assumption made in 
the MAG study.  
 
Table III.1.1: Transition and long-run effects of a 
1 pp increase in capital requirements in the euro 
area (% deviation from baseline) 
Long MAG* IIF**
Year 1 Year 4 Year 8 term Year 4 Year 4
GDP -0.05 -0.10 -0.15 -0.36 -0.16 -2.1
Investment -1.12 -1.23 -1.15 -0.86  -  -
Consumption 0.18 0.13 0.03 -0.36  -  -
Loans -0.10 -0.40 -0.52 -0.89  -  -
Deposit rate -3.00 -9.95 -11.00 -10.25  -  -
ROE -1.00 -2.26 -2.00 0.00  -  -
Loan rate -1.00 10.49 12.00 12.66  -  -
* unweighted median path across 97 models
** the results are linearly scaled to a 1pp increase
(1) The table shows pp deviations from baseline levels for GDP, 
investment, consumption and loans and basis point deviations 
from baseline for the deposit rate, ROE and loan rate. 
Source: QUEST simulations, BCBS, IIF. 
 
Table III.1.1 shows the effect of increasing capital 
requirements for euro-area commercial banks by 
1 pp according to DG ECFIN’s QUEST 
                                                        
(34) Risk could even decline if banks internalise losses more 
strongly with higher capital requirements and refrain from 
excessive risk taking. 
(35) Kashyap, A. K, J. C. Stein and S. Hanson (2010),‘An analysis 
of substantially heightened capital requirements on large 
financial institutions’, Mimeo. 
(36) Institute of International Finance (IIF) (2009), op. cit. 
(37) Myers, S. C. and N. Majluf (1984), ‘Corporate financing and 
investment decisions when firms have information that 
investors do not have’, Journal of Financial Economics, 
No 13, pp. 187-222. 
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simulations (see also Box III.1.1 for a description 
of the model used). This reduces the level of GDP 
by about in the range between 0.14 and 0.15 % 
after 8 years, depending on the transition period. 
The composition effect dominates the deposit rate 
effect, leading to an increase in marginal funding 
costs for banks. This is shifted onto the loan rate, 
which increases by about 12 bp. Because deposit 
rates decline, the spread between the loan interest 
rate and the deposit rate increases by about 22 bp. 
The impact on the overall economy runs mainly 
via investment and to a lesser extent consumption. 
Firms, expecting permanently higher capital costs, 
reduce investment in order to adjust to a lower 
capital output ratio. This is only partly offset by a 
modest positive effect on private consumption of 
a fall in deposit interest rates. Longer transition 
periods slow down the increase in lending rates 
and allow a smoother adjustment of investment. 
According to these estimates, extending the 
transition period from 4 to 8 years reduces the 
GDP losses over the first 10 years by roughly 
20 %. These effects are close to the policy impacts 
found in the MAG study (also shown in the table). 
Graph III.1.1: MAG Results for a 1 pp increase in 
capital requirements (% deviation from baseline)
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As an element of comparison, Graph III.1.1 shows 
the distribution of the GDP impact over all 97 
models used in the MAG study (38) for a 4- and 8-
year transition period respectively, by giving the 
                                                        
(38) Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) (2010a) 
(MAG Report), ‘The aggregate impact of the transition to 
stronger capital and liquidity requirements’, Basel August. 
20 % and 60 % confidence interval. With 8 years, 
the level of GDP is likely to decline by about 
0.15 % after 36 quarters and will recover to -0.1 % 
after 48 quarters. With 4-years of transition the 
GDP losses are slightly higher, because in a 
shorter time span it is more costly for banks to 
raise new capital and for borrowers to adjust to 
alternative modes of finance. The graph shows 
GDP effects from averaging country-specific 
results. The IMF used the country-specific results 
and calculated the total GDP loss taking into 
account country spillovers. Such international 
spillover effects increase the negative impact by 
0.02 %.  
These results can be used to calculate the GDP 
effect of Basel III taking into account the global 
capital shortfall. In the Quantitative Impact Study 
(QIS) (39), the Basel Committee estimated that the 
ratio of Tier 1 capital to total assets was 5.7 % at 
the end of 2009. (40) Under Basel III a minimum 
common equity ratio of 4.5 % is envisaged, 
augmented by a capital conservation buffer of 
2.5 %, yielding a total Tier 1 capital ratio of 7 % at 
the end of the transition period. This implies that 
banks have to raise the capital ratio globally on 
average by 1.3 percentage points. 
Sensitivity analysis 
The various studies presented by academic 
economists, policy institutions and commercial 
banks differ strongly concerning the assumptions 
made about the impact of the regulatory reform on 
ROE. While academic economists tend to assume 
that the ROE will fall, banks fear an increase in 
the ROE. Indeed, the study presented by the IIF 
assumes an increase in the ROE in the range 
between 200 and 400 BP (for a 2 pp increase in 
CR). 
Another concern sometimes voiced in policy 
discussions is a possible stronger impact of the 
reform on euro-area GDP because the non-
financial sector in Europe relies more heavily on 
loan financing. For example, the share of loans of 
the non-financial sector in GDP is about 1.3 % in  
                                                        
(39) Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) (2010b) 
(LEI Report), ‘An assessment of the long-term impact of 
stronger capital and liquidity requirements’, Basel August. 
(40) The EU QIS estimates 5.6 % as an average for group 1 banks 
in BE, FR, DE, IE, IT, NL, PT, ES, SE, and the UK using the 
new Basel III definitions. 
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 Box III.1.1: The QUEST model with a financial sector
The QUEST model with a financial sector is a modified version of a standard closed economy DSGE model to 
which a banking sector with bank capital has been added. In order to allow for a meaningful financial intermediation 
function of banks the household sector is disaggregated into savers and borrowers (entrepreneurs). In order to allow 
for interbank lending and borrowing the banking sector is split up into ‘savings’ and ‘investment’ banks. Savings 
banks collect deposits from households, and only lend to investment banks in the interbank market. Investment 
banks can borrow from households in the form of deposits or from savings banks. Investment banks provide loans to 
entrepreneurs.  
Savers:  
In line with van den Heuvel (2008) (1), it is assumed that savers maximise an intertemporal utility function with 
consumption, liquidity services provided by deposits and leisure as arguments. Savers can hold wealth in the form of 
either government bonds, bank deposits or bank equity and receive interest income from bonds and deposits and 
dividends. Savers require a constant equity premium on bank stocks. Savers also offer labour services to 
entrepreneurs and receive wage income. 
 
Entrepreneurs:  
Entrepreneurs maximise an intertemporal utility function over entrepreneurial consumption, subject to an 
intertemporal budget constraint, a capital accumulation constraint and a collateral constraint. They combine capital 
and labour and produce output using a Cobb Douglas production function. In order to ensure a positive share of 
loans in the balance sheet of entrepreneurs it is assumed that they have a higher rate of time preference. In this case 
solvency of entrepreneurs requires that banks restrict lending by imposing a collateral constraint. This specification 
closely follows Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) (2). 
Banks:  
Banks provide loans to entrepreneurs and take deposits from saver households. They maximise the present 
discounted value of dividends which are paid to the household sector subject to a capital and liquidity requirement 
constraint. The capital requirement demands from banks that the ratio of deposits to loans should not exceed a 
certain target ratio, otherwise the bank will be penalised (3). Banks are required to hold liquid assets as a fixed share 
of loans. This imposes an opportunity cost for banks since liquid assets (government bonds and cash) yield a lower 
return. Banks can increase capital either by issuing new shares or via retained earnings.  
 
Calibration 
In order to analyse the transition from a pre-crisis and pre-reform steady state to a post-crisis and post-reform steady 
state, the model’s pre-crisis capital ratio is calibrated using data from 2006. Calculations by the BIS, using an eight 
euro-area country aggregate balance sheet (for AT, BE, FI, FR, DE, IT, NL, ES) (4) suggest a ratio of capital and 
reserves to total assets of 5 %. Again, following BIS calculations, concerning liquidity, it is assumed that banks hold 
13 % of their assets in the form of cash or liquid assets. About 10 % of all liquid assets are held in the form of cash 
or central bank balances. About 20 % of all bank assets are interbank deposits. Concerning aggregate lending of 
banks to the non-financial private sector the model must replicate a loan-to-GDP ratio of about 1.3. The interest data 
are from the ECB: 2006 figures suggest a loan interest rate of 6.1 %, a deposit rate of 2.7 % an interbank rate of 
3.5 % and a return on bank equity of 14.3 %.  
The interest semi-elasticity of the supply of deposits of households (ISED) is a crucial parameter for this exercise, 
since it determines by how much deposit rates will fall if the demand for deposits by banks declines. A value of 10 
is assumed, which is at the upper end of existing estimates (see for example Ball (2001) (5) and Dedola et al. 
(2001)) (6). A high semi-elasticity parameter reduces the decline of the deposit rate and therefore increases the cost 
effect of an increase in capital requirements.  
                                                          
(1) Van den Heuvel, S. J. (2008), ‘The welfare cost of bank capital requirements’, Journal of Monetary Economics, Vol. 55, pp.
298-320. 
(2) Kiyotaki, N. and J. Moore (1997), ‘Credit cycles’, Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 105, pp. 211-248. 
(3) There is a quadratic cost of deviating from the target. 
(4) ECB bank balance sheet data suggest a ratio of around 6 % for the same period. 
(5) Ball, L. (2002), ‘Short run money demand’, University of Maryland, Mimeo. 
(6) Dedola, L., E. Gaiotti and L. Silipo (2001), ‘Money demand in the euro area: do national differences matter?’, Banca d’Italia 
Working Paper, No 405.  
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Europe and only 0.5 % in the US. As can be seen 
from Table III.1.2, with a loan-to-GDP ratio as 
low as that in the US, the long-run impact of 
higher CR could be reduced in absolute terms 
from -0.36 % to -0.19 %. The table also shows the 
sensitivity of the long-run impact with respect to 
variations in the ROE. In the event of a permanent 
increase of 50 bp, the negative long-run GDP 
effect could be around -0.6 %, while the GDP loss 
would be negligible if, as expected by Modigliani 
Miller, the ROE were to decline. 
 
Table III.1.2: Long-run GDP effects of a 1 pp 
increase in CR 
(1) Standard specification  -0.36
(2) US Share of loans in GDP (around 50%)  -0.19
(3) Larger/smaller equity risk premium 
(+50bp/-50bp)  -0.58 / -0.14
Source: Commission services – QUEST Simulations. 
 
Volatility  
Unfortunately, with the macro models currently 
available it is not possible to fully account for 
behavioural changes of financial market 
participants, especially regarding their attitude 
towards risk taking. Therefore, it is not possible to 
adequately measure what is probably the most 
important benefit of the regulatory reform, i.e. 
reduced risk taking by banks. The results reported 
below only show the impact of higher capital 
requirements on the volatility of GDP (measured 
by the unconditional standard deviation of GDP) 
under the assumption that attitudes towards risk 
do not change.  
 
Table III.1.3: Capital requirements and volatility 
of GDP 
QUEST Other models for 
the euro area (*)
2pp  -1.9  -2.8
4pp  -3.9  -5.4
6pp  -5.0  -7.7
* see Table 5 of Angelini et al. (2010)
Source: Commission Services. 
 
The results reported in Table III.1.3, are based on 
stochastic simulations with shocks to supply 
(TFP), demand (government expenditure) and 
monetary policy. The results show that increasing 
CR reduces the volatility of GDP. The variance of 
GDP is reduced slightly less than proportionally 
to the increase in CR. These results are in line 
with other results used in the long-term economic 
impact study (Angelini et al. (2010)). (41) 
These results refer to a reduction of GDP 
volatility in normal times, they do not refer to 
possible gains associated with reducing the 
likelihood of financial crises. A recent BoE study 
(Miles et al. (2011) (42)) provides a rough estimate 
of possible GDP gains taking into account the 
typical losses from financial crises. As shown by 
various empirical studies, financial crises are 
associated with GDP losses of about 10%. 
Assuming that about a quarter of these losses are 
permanent and using a discount rate of 2.5% p. a. 
the permanent GDP loss of one financial crisis is 
about 140% of one year's GDP. If higher 
regulation would reduce the likelihood of all 
financial crises in the future by 1% and applying 
the same discount rate, the gain from regulation 
would be 55% of one year's GDP. This benefit 
can be compared to the permanent GDP reduction 
due to regulation which we estimate to 0.36%. 
The present discounted value of this permanent 
GDP loss amounts to about 14% of one year's 
GDP, if one applies the same discount rate. Thus, 
the permanent GDP gain from financial market 
regulation could be substantial.  
Conclusions 
This section presents an analysis of the costs of 
increased capital requirements for banks, using a 
DSGE model with a banking sector and bank 
capital. An inherent degree of uncertainty 
surrounds these estimates, stemming principally 
from the ambiguous response of the return on 
equity, although on balance it appears reasonable 
to expect no large impact. Results are in line with 
those used in the MAG study. According to these 
results, banks will shift the cost of tighter 
regulation onto borrowers in the form of higher 
interest rates. The model stresses two mitigating 
factors. First, a reduction in deposit rates, which 
partly offsets the cost increase implied by higher 
capital requirements, and second, a move towards 
higher rates of self-financing.  
The paper also finds that higher capital adequacy 
brings potential benefits in terms of lower GDP 
volatility, a slightly lower estimated level of GDP 
in this scenario notwithstanding. However, the 
                                                        
(41) Angelini, P., L. Clerc, V. Cúrdia, L. Gambacorta, A. Gerali, 
A. Locarno, R. Motto, W. Roeger, S. Van den Heuvel and 
J. Vlček (2010), ‘BASEL III: Long-term impact on economic 
performance and fluctuations’, BIS Working Papers, No 338.  
(42) Miles, D., J. Yang, G. Marcheggiano (2011), ‘Optimal bank 
capital’, Bank of England Discussion Paper, No 31, January 
2011. 
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GDP losses in normal times, due to regulation 
must be seen in relation to permanent GDP losses 
from financial crises. Estimates taking this into 
account yield substantial net social benefits. 
However, research on crisis prevention due to 
regulation is still at its infancy and more work is 
needed in order to come up with more precise  
estimates concerning the extent in which the risk 
of large financial crises can be reduced by more 
stringent financial market regulation. For this 
task, current macro models still need to be 
improved in order to adequately address possible 
excessive risk taking of banks in the presence of 
limited liability.  
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III.2.  Estonia in the euro area: staying fit 
 in monetary union  
Introduction 
With the entry of Estonia into the euro area on 1 
January 2011 the country has reached the deepest 
stage of economic and monetary integration in the 
EU. Against the unwavering prospect of eventual 
euro adoption, Estonia experienced fast 
convergence supported by high economic growth 
and declining unemployment over several years. 
However, significant macro-economic imbalances 
accumulated on the back of an overheating 
economy, which led to postponement of euro 
adoption, initially envisaged to take place shortly 
after EU accession in 2004. Like in other euro-
area Member States, the unwinding of these 
imbalances was amplified by the fallout from the 
global economic crisis, thus raising the challenges 
for euro adoption. Yet, thanks to impressive fiscal 
consolidation, comparatively flexible labour 
markets and additional structural reforms 
undertaken, Estonia successfully managed to fulfil 
the conditions for the adoption of the euro.  
This section describes Estonia’s economic 
adjustment path and the main policy actions taken 
towards euro adoption. It concludes with some 
policy lessons for successful economic 
performance in the euro area.  
Economic convergence accelerated ahead of 
EU membership in 2004 and afterwards … 
In the early 2000s, Estonia was quickly 
recovering from the Russian crisis and 
strengthening its economic, financial and 
institutional ties with the EU, especially with the 
Nordic countries. The factors that made Estonia 
stand out among other transition economies were 
its overall prudent fiscal policy, the very low level 
of its public debt, and a simple and efficient 
system of taxation that favoured business 
investment. The currency board regime provided 
exchange rate stability and served as the main 
policy anchor, helping to contain inflation. Such a 
policy mix was well-suited to a small open 
economy. The improving external environment, a 
sound macro-economic policy framework, and the 
prospect of EU entry contributed to high 
investment and fast catching up. These factors 
boosted private sector confidence and brought 
about significant economic convergence with the 
EU, at an increasing speed. 
Estonia’s GDP growth rate in 2000-2007 
averaged as much as 8.4 %. It was primarily 
driven by very high capital deepening and TFP 
growth. Foreign direct investment increased 
significantly, contributing to buoyant exports. 
Estonia’s share of exports of goods and services 
in world exports rose until 2006, mostly thanks to 
a successful re-orientation and specialisation of 
exports in response to EU demand and favourable 
economic outlook in the main trade partners. (43) 
In addition to a strong external sector, an 
increasingly important contribution to growth 
came from buoyant domestic demand, which was 
fuelled by financial convergence. A robust 
catching-up record and improved access to cross-
border bank finance in anticipation of Estonia’s 
EU accession dramatically reduced risk premia. 
Nominal interest rates declined to levels very 
close to those of the euro area, and real interest 
rates turned negative by mid-2000. Starting from 
a low position, private credit expanded robustly, 
permitting large and sustained — but ultimately 
not sustainable — gains in investment and 
consumption expenditure. Domestic demand 
surged, leading to a significant deterioration of the 
current account from -4.8 % of GDP in 2001 to -
17.2 % in 2007.   
Similarly to some other EU economies, including 
within the euro area, the demand boom was partly 
driven by strong investment flows into residential 
property and the associated rise in construction 
activity. Compared to 2001-2004, construction 
sector growth more than tripled in the years after 
accession, averaging 18.5 % in 2005-2007, and 
other non-tradable sectors also expanded robustly. 
This boom was mirrored in the labour market, 
where employment expanded strongly and the 
activity rate increased. The unemployment rate 
dropped from 14 % in 2000 to less than 5 % in 
2007. Similarly to the pre-crisis experience of the 
other Baltics and peripheral euro-area Member 
States, employment growth took place almost 
exclusively in the non-tradable sector, drawing 
workers away from other sectors.  
… with signs of overheating by 2007 
By 2007, significant imbalances became apparent 
and were accompanied by clear signs of 
overheating. The positive output gap increased to 
above 10 %, according to Commission estimates. 
                                                        
(43) A thorough account of the convergence, boom and 
subsequent bust is presented in European Commission 
(2010), ‘Economic policy challenges in the Baltics’, 
Directorate-General for Economic and Financial Affairs, 
Occasional Papers, No 58. 
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Both household and corporate debt doubled 
between 2001 and 2007, reaching 123 % of GDP. 
Annual growth of imports exceeded 17 % in 2007, 
pushing the current account deficit to 
unsustainable levels. Labour market bottlenecks, 
such as skill shortages, combined with increased 
employment in the booming low-productivity 
construction sector, resulted in wage increases 
outpacing productivity and pushed up unit labour 
costs. Together with the increase in inflation due 
to strong domestic demand and overheating, this 
contributed to the erosion of external 
competitiveness and to a significant appreciation 
of the real effective exchange rate. The surge of 
inflation to well beyond the Maastricht reference 
criterion put a brake on the prospect of early euro 
adoption. 
Some policy action was taken to counter the 
overheating pressures, although the choice of 
policy instruments at the government’s disposal 
was rather restricted. With monetary policy 
focused on maintaining the currency board and in 
the light of the limited role of automatic 
stabilisers in a country with a small government 
size, the main tools for macro-economic 
stabilisation were discretionary fiscal policy and 
prudential and supervisory policies in the 
financial sector. Starting from 2006, banks’ 
minimum reserve requirements were raised and 
the rules for the computation of capital adequacy 
were tightened. Given that the banking sector in 
Estonia is almost entirely foreign-owned, 
cooperation with supervisory authorities in 
relevant countries was strengthened. On the fiscal 
side, a somewhat belated policy response was 
aimed at reducing the incentives to borrow while 
relatively high tax rates on distributed dividends 
encouraged banks to maintain large capital and 
liquidity buffers. (44) As regards government 
expenditure, significant nominal surpluses were 
recorded in 2005-2007, but fiscal policy remained 
pro-cyclical in structural terms and likely 
contributed to overheating. 
The financial crisis triggered significant real 
adjustment at a high cost  
Preceded by a turnaround of the credit and 
housing cycles in 2007, the economic adjustment 
in Estonia already started in early 2008, but was 
considerably reinforced by the escalation of the 
global financial crisis as from September 2008.  
                                                        
(44) Purfield, C. and C. Rosenberg (2010), ‘Adjustment under a 
currency peg: Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania during the global 
financial crisis 2008-09’, IMF Working Paper, WP/10/213. 
Graph III.2.1: GDP gap with the euro area and growth decomposition, Estonia (in %) 
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The downturn was ultimately prompted by 
excessive real estate prices, high private sector 
indebtedness and a tightening of credit. Already 
before the crisis, Nordic banks began reassessing 
the economic outlook of the Baltics and imposing 
tighter credit rules, also in the light of rising 
policy rates applied by national central banks in 
Europe and elsewhere. This resulted in an 
increase in real interest rates in Estonia to pre-
2000s levels. The demand for housing loans fell, 
which led to a deceleration of real estate 
transactions and falling asset prices. This in turn 
immediately affected output and employment in 
construction, real estate, and financial services. 
The contraction subsequently spread across other 
sectors, prompting a fall of domestic demand.  
The negative shock from domestic demand was 
amplified by the subsequent global liquidity 
crunch and a steep fall of exports, hit by the 
collapse of the trade guarantees market. The drop 
in world demand, magnified by the severe 
regional impact of the global trade crisis, hit the 
open Estonian economy very hard. Additional 
negative repercussions from the global financial 
crisis stemmed from the flight to safety in 
financial markets and an upward pressure on 
interest rates resulting from the currency board 
arrangement and a corresponding need to ensure 
adequate inflows of foreign capital. Overall, the 
cumulative GDP loss in Estonia in 2008-2009 
amounted to 19 %.  
In the face of this serious crisis, a major challenge 
was to ensure macro-economic stability, to avoid 
putting private sector net worth at risk and to keep 
the prospect of euro adoption open. Estonia had to 
rely on internal adjustment to absorb the negative 
shock of the economic bust and to proceed along a 
path of considerable restructuring of the economy.  
Given the comparatively flexible labour market in 
Estonia, employment swiftly reacted to the drop 
in GDP, with the most pronounced decline in 
employment taking place in the non-tradable 
sectors. The unemployment rate rocketed from 
4.8 % in 2007 to 17.3 % in 2010. Labour shedding 
was at times preceded but also often accompanied 
by a reduction of working time, if necessary 
through a modification of work contracts. This led 
to a significant decline in the wage bill. After a 
two-year decline, productivity growth turned 
positive again to +7.4 % in 2010 according to the 
estimation of the Commission’s forecast. Unit 
labour costs moderated significantly in 2009 and 
decreased by almost 7% in 2010, which, in 
combination with inflation dropping from 10.6 % 
in 2008 to 2.7 % in 2010, helped to correct 
relative prices. For instance, the real effective 
exchange rate as measured by unit labour cost 
relative to the main industrialised countries is 
expected to have declined by 9.2 % in 2010.  
Public expenditures had increased significantly 
during the boom years. With the crisis, tax 
revenues collapsed and the deficit risked spinning 
out of control. The only policy option that was 
fully consistent with the currency board was to 
embark upon rapid fiscal consolidation. Indeed, 
Estonia implemented a sizeable consolidation 
package allowing it to regain stability and 
maintain its deficit below the Maastricht 
requirement, thus, opening the door to euro 
introduction. 
Zooming in on labour market adjustment  
Reliance on labour market flexibility was an 
essential element of the adjustment that took place 
in Estonia over the last two years. Estonia’s 
labour market institutions involve a high degree of 
quantitative flexibility, i.e. allowing adjustment 
through lay-offs and working time flexibility, but 
also a high degree of wage flexibility. Indeed, the 
drop in private sector employment accounted for 
the bulk of labour shedding over the past two 
years, with job losses across all sectors of activity. 
The accelerated adoption of the new labour law, 
effective since July 2009, contributed to a swifter 
adjustment by reducing lay-off costs for regular 
contracts and easing hiring, although labour 
protection had already been rather light de facto 
since the early 2000s. (45)  
The reduction of working hours was used more 
intensively in Estonia than in other Member 
States. (46) Instead of lay-offs, many companies 
opted for the introduction of part-time 
employment, cutbacks in working hours, and 
partially paid vacations. As a result, the drop in 
hourly productivity in 2008-2009 remained 
smaller and was less prolonged than that of 
productivity per employee (see Graph III.2.2). 
The improved economic outlook in 2010 led to an 
increase in working hours before translating into 
employment growth. 
Downward flexibility of wages was another 
important adjustment channel to alleviate the 
negative effects of the shock. The decentralised 
                                                        
(45) Eamets, R. and J. Masso (2007), ‘Macro-level labour market 
flexibility in the Baltic States’, in Paas and Eamets (eds.) 
‘Labour Market Flexibility, Flexicurity, and Employment: 
Lessons from the Baltic States’. 
(46) Bank of Estonia (2010), Labour Market Review, No 2/2010. 
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wage setting and company-level bargaining that 
prevails in the Estonian labour market facilitated 
downward nominal wage adjustments in a way 
that was similar to the adjustment after the 
Russian crisis in 1999. In 2009, compensation per 
employee fell by more than 3 %. Such a rapid 
nominal downward correction is rather unusual, 
and only took place in a handful of countries in 
the EU, namely in the Baltics and in Hungary. 
Graph III.2.2: Labour productivity, Estonia  
(y-o-y changes in %, 2008Q1 to 2010Q3) 
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Source: Commission services. 
In addition to the nominal adjustment of base 
wages, non-wage adjustment strategies appear to 
have played an important role in Estonia, too. The 
pre-crisis micro-level evidence suggests that 
almost every worker in Estonia has been affected 
by at least one non-statutory non-wage 
adjustment, with a reduction of bonus payments 
being the most common response, adopted by 
about 40 % of firms, almost twice as many as in 
the euro-area on average (47). The importance of 
bonus payments is captured by the difference 
between the growth of average monthly and 
hourly gross wages during the adjustment period: 
the latter decreased less rapidly and is now 
recovering more slowly than monthly wages. 
Furthermore, wage freezes appear to be more 
significant and automatic indexation less frequent 
in Estonia than in other peripheral euro-area 
Member States. (48)  
While nominal labour market flexibility is 
important, it is the functional flexibility of the 
labour market (i.e. the availability of transferrable 
skills) that allows individuals to better adapt to 
                                                        
(47) Babecký, J., P. Du Caju, T. Kosma, M. Lawless, J. Messina 
and T. Rõõm (2009), ‘The margins of labour cost adjustment: 
Survey evidence from European firms’, Czech National 
Bank, Working paper Series, No 7. 
(48) Ibid. 
structural and technological changes. (49) In the 
past, skill shortages and mismatches in Estonia 
led to rapid real wage increase in periods of 
expansion and contributed to the emergence of 
imbalances. The Beveridge curve for Estonia, 
which relates unemployment to job vacancies, 
shows the negative effect of the recession that is 
reflected in a falling number of vacancies and a 
substantial increase in unemployment. While skill 
shortages have not yet become apparent, 
rebalancing the economy may require investment 
in skills and human capital to facilitate the 
transition of labour to the tradable sectors and to 
prevent unemployment from becoming structural.  
Graph III.2.3: Beveridge curve  
(in%, 2008Q1 to 2010Q4) 
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Some lessons from the adjustment experience 
in Estonia 
Overall, the absorption of the negative shock of 
the global financial and economic crisis was 
similar in Estonia to other countries in the EU 
where economic expansion prior to the crisis had 
relied on excessive credit growth and a 
concentration of employment in less productive 
sectors. The output of the non-tradable sector 
collapsed, accompanied by significant labour 
shedding and unemployment spikes. It also 
appears that, similar to other Baltic States, wage 
and working time adjustment in Estonia helped to 
regain competitiveness and facilitated adjustment. 
This contrasts with the experience of peripheral 
euro-area Member States where, with the 
exception of Ireland, wage stickiness resulted in 
nominal wage increases even when employment 
plummeted. With productivity on the rise, unit 
labour costs dropped by as much as 7-8 % in 
Estonia in 2010 and are likely to remain subdued 
in following years.  
                                                        
(49) See, for example, Brixiova ,Z. (2009), ‘Labour market 
flexibility in Estonia: What more can be done?’, OECD 
Economic Department Working Paper, No 697. 
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The economic rebound in 2010, which amounted 
to 3.1 %, has been achieved while keeping public 
sector deficit under control and well within the 
limits of the Stability and Growth Pact. A sizeable 
fiscal adjustment of over 10 % in 2008-2010 
helped to ensure fiscal sustainability — given the 
structural misalignment between revenues and 
expenditures resulting from the boom years — 
and allowed the government debt to be kept 
contained. In contrast to most other Member 
States, prudent fiscal policy in Estonia before the 
crisis helped to build up liquidity reserves and 
ensured that public sector finances were not 
constraining the ongoing recovery. 
Over the last two years, a number of macro-
economic and prudential measures were 
introduced to help restore the normal functioning 
of financial markets and repair private sector 
balance sheets. Private sector loan indebtedness 
has been slowly declining since autumn 2008 (but 
only since early 2010 in GDP terms given the 
large denominator effect) to reach 106 % of GDP 
in 2010, with the loan and leasing portfolio 
decreasing by 6.3 % in 2010. Equity prices rose by 
75 % in 2010 in view of the prospect of euro 
adoption, supporting private sector wealth and 
strengthening households’ balance sheets. 
However, deleveraging may take time and private 
sector indebtedness remains rather high.  
The banking sector is well capitalised (the average 
solvency ratio of banks operating in Estonia has 
stabilised around 22 % since early 2009) and the 
pace of deterioration of banks’ assets has been 
slowing down. Last year, Estonia adopted a bank 
resolution law, which should enable it to take 
timely action required to secure the stability and 
credibility of the financial system. The law also 
reinforces the powers of the national supervisory 
authority, which should help to control credit 
growth. The supervisory cooperation in the 
Nordic-Baltic region, including a multilateral 
cooperation agreement on cross-border financial 
stability, crisis management and resolution signed 
in August 2010, helps to ensure financial sector 
stability, which is essential to attracting capital 
and fostering investment. 
The relatively strong fiscal position and rapid 
adjustment in the labour market supported the 
improvement in cost competitiveness, 
contributing to a swift recovery of the tradable 
sector once the global economic outlook started to 
improve. Indeed, output in the second half of 
2010 was mainly driven by the strong growth of 
the exporting manufacturing sector.  
As the global recovery gains ground, the 
economic outlook in Estonia relies upon the 
swiftness and sustainability of the ongoing 
sectoral rebalancing. By building foundations for 
sustainable growth, structural reforms are likely to 
play the key role.  
Measures that improve market functioning and 
facilitate better resource allocation – such as 
measures to improve skills matching and mobility, 
reduction of labour costs, better framework 
conditions for innovation, and a business-friendly 
regulatory environment – can yield the double 
benefit of helping to restore price competitiveness 
and facilitating rebalancing towards exports, 
while at the same time fostering potential growth 
via capital and TFP growth. They are 
indispensible to ensure the successful 
performance of Estonia within the euro area.   
Conclusion 
During the last ten years Estonia achieved 
significant economic convergence with the EU. 
This result was supported by a policy mix that 
was based on a currency board regime and backed 
up by relatively sound fiscal policy and low 
public debt. Nevertheless, fiscal discipline alone 
was not sufficient to guarantee overall macro-
economic stability. Financial convergence fuelled 
strong domestic credit growth, which from the 
mid-2000s led to a construction boom and, 
eventually, to overheating. Similarly to other 
countries experiencing persistent external 
imbalances, Estonia was particularly hard-hit by 
the global financial crisis, with surging 
unemployment and a cumulative GDP loss in 
2008-2009 amounting to 19 %.  
Currently, Estonia is undergoing a significant 
adjustment process. In this context, an important 
lesson from the crisis is that policies actually do 
make a difference. Measures introduced by 
Estonia to ensure flexible labour markets, and 
prudent fiscal and financial policies have limited 
the damage brought by the crisis and are 
contributing to a fast export-driven recovery. 
Maintaining an appropriate policy framework, 
strengthening the foundations for higher potential 
growth and ensuring economic surveillance to 
avoid the emergence of new imbalances are key 
elements of the strategy to support both the 
sustainability of the resuming real convergence 
process and successful economic performance in 
the euro area.  
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III.3. Dissecting the recovery with survey 
data 
The European Commission has been running the 
Joint Harmonised EU Programme of Business and 
Consumer Surveys (BCS) since 1961. The 
programme now embraces 7 major surveys 
(industry, services, construction, retail, 
consumers, financial services and investment) in 
30 countries, with more than 125 000 firms and 
40 000 consumers surveyed every month across 
the EU. This section draws on this wealth of 
information to analyse the ongoing recovery, 
notably by comparing it to major cyclical 
recoveries in the past. (50)  
Business and consumer survey data are important 
tools for short-term forecasting. They can, 
however, also be used to analyse the business 
cycle with two major advantages over the hard 
data generally used for this purpose (quarterly 
national accounts, industrial production, etc.). 
First, confidence surveys are easier to interpret 
than hard data: usually they don’t require filtering 
methods to disentangle trend and cycle, (51) they 
are available early and subject to only limited 
revisions. Second, surveys can help track features 
of the business cycle that cannot be measured 
with hard data, including various expectations on 
the part of households and companies, their 
assessment of specific risks (e.g. unemployment 
or financial) and their assessment of the general 
economic situation.  
A synchronised but unbalanced recovery… 
Based on the Commission’s Economic Sentiment 
Indicator (ESI), which summaries confidence in 
major sectors of the economy, the euro-area 
business cycle peaked in spring 2007 and began 
falling abruptly in the ensuing summer. (52) The 
indicator reached an unprecedented trough in 
March 2009, but has since recovered significantly 
and almost continuously to reach levels 
                                                        
(50) This section is based on survey data up to February 2011. 
Therefore, the recent dramatic events that have hit Japan are 
not reflected either in the analysis or in the underlying 
figures. 
(51) There is general agreement that survey data are stationary and 
track cyclical conditions, even if filters may sometimes be 
needed to remove possible high frequency noise. Most (but 
not all) confidence indicators should be interpreted in terms 
of cyclical growth. 
(52) The ESI is a weighted average of sentiment in industry, 
services, retail and construction as well as among consumers. 
Further information on the ESI and other BCS data can be 
found on DG ECFIN’s BCS website:  
http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/db_indicators/surveys/i
ndex_en.htm. 
approaching the cyclical peak of summer 2007 
(Graph III.3.1).  
Graph III.3.1: Economic Sentiment Indicator, 
euro area (Jan 85 to Feb 11) 
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Source: Commission services. 
The ongoing recovery in sentiment has generally 
been closely synchronised across sectors: 
confidence has picked up in the same month 
(April 2009) in industry, in services and among 
consumers, with only construction lagging behind 
by 2 months (see Graph III.3.2). This contrasts 
with the previous two major recoveries of the 
early 1990s and early 2000s which were 
considerably less synchronised and were 
characterised, in particular, by substantial lags in 
the rebound of consumer confidence.  
Graph III.3.2: Confidence indicators in various 
sectors, euro area (Jan 07 to Feb 11) 
(balances) (1) 
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Source: Commission services. 
Notwithstanding this close synchronisation, the 
strength of the upswing in confidence since March 
2009 has varied significantly across sectors. 
Sentiment in the euro area has been primarily 
driven by industry, where confidence is now 
approaching its pre-crisis peak (Graph III.3.2). 
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Interestingly, sentiment in the financial sector 
(which is tracked in a dedicated survey) has also 
recovered strongly to levels last seen in summer 
2007, i.e. right before the onset of the financial 
crisis. In contrast, the recovery has been more 
muted for (non-financial) market services and for 
consumers, with sentiment at or slightly above the 
long-term trend, respectively. It has been 
extremely weak in the construction sector where 
activity probably remains in contraction mode.  
This sectoral pattern supports the idea that the 
main engine of recovery in the euro area has so 
far been a sharp rebound in world trade, which 
has mainly boosted industrial activity, while 
domestic demand has been slower to get traction. 
A comparison with the two major previous 
recoveries, further confirms the unbalanced 
pattern of the ongoing recovery. The rise in 
confidence since March 2009 has been 
characterised by a stronger role of industry than in 
the early 1990s and early 2000s, which may also 
be a testimony to the unusually large drop in 
industrial activity during the Great Recession.  
… characterised by unusually sluggish growth  
In addition to an unbalanced pattern, the ongoing 
recovery is also characterised by unusually 
sluggish GDP growth. Signals from hard data 
have so far not been as strong as relatively upbeat 
survey readings would have suggested (see 
Graph III.3.4). There are several possible 
explanations for this decoupling: 
• There was a well-known decoupling between 
hard and soft data around the trough of the 
cycle which can be mainly explained by the 
existence of non-linearity at times of very deep 
recession. (53) At this stage of the cycle, 
however, the non-linearity should not affect 
data anymore.  
• The present decoupling could signal a period 
of overshooting in household and business 
confidence. Statistical tests suggest, however, 
that the decoupling has been in place for 
several years now. This appears quite long for 
a period of overshooting of confidence.  
• Finally, the decoupling could reflect the fact 
that the euro-area economy has shifted onto a 
                                                        
(53) Whereas there is, in practice, no lower bound to a rate of 
contraction of GDP, there is a lower limit to confidence 
indicators due to the fact that, once 100% of respondents 
report a deterioration in activity, no further loss in the 
confidence indicator is possible.  
significantly lower growth path. This 
explanation would be in line with the 
information provided by Commission 
estimates of potential output. (54) It would also 
be in line with a range of empirical studies 
which point to significant and lasting losses in 
GDP  growth in the aftermath of major 
financial or banking crises. (55) 
Graph III.3.3: GDP growth and Economic 
Sentiment Indicator, euro area  
(2006Q1 to 2010Q4) 
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Source: Commission services. 
Short-term prospects remain reasonably 
upbeat in most sectors 
Sentiment indicators do not send clear signals of 
having reached a peak, suggesting that the 
recovery remains on track. This is particularly 
clear from survey data for industry which show 
that order books are still rising and that activity is 
still picking up momentum. By contrast, during 
the 1993-95 recovery, a stabilisation of order 
books was already visible at this stage of the 
cycle. Another positive signal comes from the 
relationship between stocks and production 
expectations, which is now normalising after 
diverging from its usual path during the recession 
period. Manufacturers’ assessment of stocks is at 
historical lows, suggesting that stock-building will 
contribute significantly to demand in the coming 
months (Graph III.3.4).  
Regarding short-term prospects for services, the 
latest readings of the surveys are also 
encouraging, although somewhat weaker than in 
industry. Demand expectations have levelled off 
in the past couple of months but observed demand 
                                                        
(54) See, European Commission's AMECO database 
(55) See for instance Reinhart, C and K. Rogoff (2009), 'This time 
is different: Eight centuries of financial folly', Princeton 
University Press.   
IMF (2009), 'What's the damage? Medium-term output 
dynamics after financial crises', World Economic Outlook 
(October). 
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remains on an upward path. Positive signals for 
domestic demand are also coming from the retail 
trade sector, where confidence has followed an 
upward, albeit volatile, recovery path since March 
2009, settling now well above its long-term 
average and at pre-crisis peak levels.  
Graph III.3.4: Assessment of stocks, euro-area 
industry (Jan 85 to Feb 11) (balances) 
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Source: Commission services. 
The only industrial sector where the short-term 
outlook remains clearly sluggish is construction. 
The sector has so far shown limited signs of 
recovery. Confidence remains well below 
historical averages and since the last fall it has 
shown very limited gains, with discontinuities due 
to temporarily constrained activity following 
adverse weather conditions in December and 
January. Weather-related constraints have now 
faded away, but despite very low interest rates the 
sector's outlook remains hampered by weak 
demand and order books still well below historical 
averages. Overall, the euro-area construction 
sector seems to be in for a long period of 
adjustment following its pre-crisis boom.  
But there are causes for concern on medium-
term recovery prospects on the consumer 
side… 
Notwithstanding these positive short-term signals, 
surveys also point to a number of possible 
impediments to the ongoing recovery that could 
weigh on growth in the medium term. A 
systematic comparison with developments in 
sentiment in the aftermath of the 1992-93 
recession (i.e. the recovery of 1993-95) points to a 
number of worrying patterns in the ongoing 
recovery, including lingering uncertainties among 
consumers, weak corporate investment plans and 
possible supply constraints in industry. (56) The 
                                                        
  
comparison also shows that the ongoing recovery 
has so far been comparatively uneven across euro-
area countries, pointing to an unusual degree of 
divergence among Member States.  
Turning first to consumers, the ongoing recovery 
in sentiment has shown, so far, a dynamic 
relatively similar to that observed after the 1992-
1993 recession: a strong and fast rebound during 
the first year, followed by a 
deceleration/stagnation period. However, while 
the 1993-1995 recovery saw the stagnation phase 
start once crisis losses had been broadly recouped, 
consumer confidence currently remains well 
below the peak levels registered in 2007, and also 
lower than at a similar stage of the 1993-95 
recovery. This suggests a premature stabilisation 
of sentiment, which could weigh on medium-term 
prospects for consumption. 
Graph III.3.5: Consumers’ expectations as to the 
general economic situation, euro area 
(balances) (1) 
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Source: Commission services. 
As in the 1993-1995 recovery, consumers’ views 
on overall prospects for the economy (namely 
their expectations about the general economic 
situation and unemployment fears) have been the 
main driver of confidence. In particular, 
consumers’ assessment of general economic 
prospects began to stall at the end of 2009, i.e. 
much earlier than in the recovery of the previous 
decade (see Graph III.3.5). The recent dynamics 
of that indicator, in particular its temporary sharp 
drop in May and June 2010, could suggest that the 
sovereign debt tensions are having a significant 
                                                                                  
(56) In the remainder of this section, comparisons with previous 
major recoveries are restricted to the 1993-95 recovery. 
Comparisons with the recovery of the early 2000s are less 
meaningful as the downturn of the early 2000s was relatively 
shallow and not a recession per se. Comparisons with the 
recession of the early 1980s are unfortunately not possible as 
survey data are only available since 1985.  
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effect on consumer confidence in the euro area. In 
any event, consumers’ concerns about the general 
economic situation are now greater than at a 
similar stage of the 1993-95 recovery.  
Consumers’ concerns in terms of unemployment 
fears have evolved in broadly similar ways during 
the two recoveries. It is noteworthy, however, that 
the deterioration in sentiment regarding 
unemployment was far bigger in the latest 
recession than during its predecessor of the 1990s 
(Graph III.3.6). As a result, whereas 
unemployment fears had receded to their pre-
crisis level in 1995, they are now still 
substantially higher than before the onset of the 
global financial and economic crisis. This is 
somewhat surprising given that job losses or rises 
in unemployment registered rather similar 
magnitudes during the two recessions. Despite 
substantial improvements in labour market 
performance in the 2000s compared with the 
previous decade (measurable notably in terms of 
lower structural unemployment), in the wake of 
the latest recession, consumers in the euro area 
thus continue to be suspicious about the 
functioning of labour markets.  
Graph III.3.6: Consumers’ unemployment 
expectations, euro area (balances) (1) 
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Source: Commission services. 
Finally, and not very surprisingly, the latest 
recession has left deep scars in sentiment via its 
impact on consumers’ perception of their 
individual financial situation. This is particularly 
visible in consumers’ assessments of their 
expected financial position over the next 12 
months (see Graph III.3.7). The indicator saw a 
rapid increase in the early stage of the ongoing 
recovery, which came to halt at the end of 2009 
and was followed by significant drops in the 
period from February to July 2010 with the 
escalation of sovereign debt tensions. The 
indicator is now well below its 1995 level.  
Overall, the comparison with the cycle of the 
early 1990s points to lingering worries among 
consumers involving both general macroeconomic 
uncertainties and concerns about the effect of the 
crisis on their personal financial situation. This 
means that precautionary savings could remain 
high for some time, weighing on prospects for 
private consumption.  
Graph III.3.7: Consumers’ expected financial 
situation, euro area (balances) (1) 
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Source: Commission services. 
… and possible impediments to medium-term 
recovery prospects on the corporate side  
Business surveys also point to possible 
impediments to the recovery on the supply side. 
Capacity utilisation reached a trough between 
2009Q2 and 2009Q3, following an abrupt and 
deep downturn leading to its lowest level ever 
(and well below the level reached in the 1993 
crisis — see Graph III.3.8). Against the backdrop 
of a strong recovery in industrial activity, capacity 
utilisation has rebounded since 2009Q3, but is 
currently (7 quarters after the trough) still below 
its long-term average and significantly below its 
level at the same stage of the recovery in 1993-95.  
The current subdued rate of capacity utilisation in 
the manufacturing sector points to sluggish 
growth in investment in the near term. This is 
indeed consistent with manufacturers’ investment 
plans as reported in business surveys. According 
to the latest investment survey (November 2010), 
manufacturers intend to raise investment by 2 % 
in volume in 2011. This is well below their 
investment plans at a similar stage of the business 
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cycle in the 1990s. (57) A more systematic 
comparison of investment cycles as reported in 
surveys actually shows that capital formation 
reached a similar trough in 1993 and 2009 (with a 
contraction of close to 20 % in real terms), but 
rebounded more strongly in 1993-95 than in 2010-
2011. Contrary to the recovery of the 1990s, 
manufacturers' investment plans are currently 
more geared at replacing equipment than 
expanding capacity and suffer from more sluggish 
demand prospects.  
Graph III.3.8: Capacity utilisation, euro-area 
industry (in %) (1) 
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Source: Commission services. 
Beyond short-term prospects for domestic 
demand, persistent weakness in corporate 
investment plans also raises concerns about the 
euro-area’s supply capacity. Graph III.3.9 
displays an indicator tracking developments in 
production capacity in industry. The indicator 
combines information from surveys (capacity 
utilisation rate) and hard data (industrial 
production) to give an assessment of production 
capacity in industry, i.e. the maximum level of 
production that manufacturers can attain by 
mobilising all resources at their disposal. (58)  
As can be seen from the graph, production 
capacity in industry generally trends upwards over 
time, most likely due to a combination of capital 
accumulation, labour force expansion and 
technical progress. Major cyclical downturns are 
associated with a downward inflection of the 
indicator, most likely due to a number of factors 
that temporarily hamper supply capacity, 
                                                        
(57) In November 1994, manufacturers anticipated an increase in 
investment of 8 % in 1995. 
(58) More precisely, the indicator is constructed as the ratio of 
industrial production to capacity utilisation in industry. The 
indicator is smoothed by taking a four-quarters moving 
average. It can be interpreted as a measure of industrial 
capacity consistent with the capacity utilisation rate reported 
in surveys. 
including slower capital accumulation, lost 
employee skills, temporary losses in supply due to 
sectoral reallocation, etc. Such inflections are 
visible in 1993 and, to a lesser degree, in 2002-03. 
The latest recession, however, stands out with a 
sharp drop in the estimated level of production 
capacity in industry, well above anything recorded 
in the previous decades. This suggests that in the 
absence of a rapid recovery in investment, the 
recovery in the euro-area industry could face 
supply constraints in the near future. (59)  
Graph III.3.9: Production capacity, euro-area 
industry (index base 1992=100) (1) 
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(1) The indicator is constructed as the ratio of industrial 
production to capacity utilisation in industry (Jan-91 to Jan-11). 
Source: Commission services. 
A multispeed recovery across Member States 
During the 1993 crisis, sentiment reached its 
trough in euro-area Member States in a less 
synchronised way than in the latest crisis, when 
almost all the euro-area countries bottomed out in 
March 2009. In contrast, the ensuing recovery was 
much more homogeneous across countries in 
1993 than what can be observed currently. The 
divergence among Member States as shown in 
Graph III.3.10 has almost tripled since the 
beginning of the ongoing recovery, pointing to a 
much more uneven recovery in sentiment among 
euro-area Member States than in 1993-95. (60)  
In particular, the divergence mirrors the fact that 
the rebound of the ESI (Graph III.3.11) observed 
in core countries (with Germany, Belgium and the 
Netherlands firmly in the lead) has so far been 
significantly stronger than in periphery countries 
                                                        
(59) It is worth stressing that corporate investment is probably not 
the only area where action is needed to restore capacity. 
Improving labour skills and facilitating the sectoral 
reallocation of production resources triggered by the 
economic crisis are important areas as well. 
(60) Divergence is measured as the standard deviation of the ESI 
across countries over two years. 
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(Greece, Portugal and Spain), where confidence 
has recovered only partially and still stands below 
‘normal’ levels (long-term average). 
Graph III.3.10: Standard deviation of the ESI 
across EA-17 Member States (in %) 
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Source: Commission services. 
 
Graph III.3.11: ESI rebound vs ESI level 
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Conclusion 
Business and consumer survey data are an 
important tool to analyse business cycle 
developments. Survey data show that the recovery 
which began in spring 2009 and is still ongoing 
has been closely synchronised across sectors but 
has also been unbalanced – mostly driven by 
industry – and associated with unusually sluggish 
GDP growth.  
At this stage, sentiment indicators do not send 
clear signals of having reached a peak, suggesting 
that the recovery from the Great Recession 
remains on track. Nevertheless, a systematic 
comparison with developments in sentiment in the 
aftermath of the 1992-93 recession points to a 
number of patterns in the ongoing recovery. 
Lingering uncertainties among households, 
particularly about their financial situation, 
unemployment risks and general economic 
prospects point to downside risks on private 
consumption. On the corporate side, 
manufacturers' investment plans remain sluggish 
and there is evidence that the crisis may have 
brought about significant losses in production 
capacity. Finally, the recovery is also 
characterised by more marked differences in the 
pick-up of activity across countries than in 
previous similar cyclical episodes, a factor that 
calls for differentiated policy approaches across 
the euro area. 
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